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INTERNET PARSHA SHEET
ON TZAV – SHABBOS HAGADOL - 5775

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Rabbi Yisroel Reisman – Parshas Tzav 5774

1. Let us talk first about Parshas Tzav. We find in Parshas Tzav in Perek 8 that Moshe Rabbeinu is commanded to dress and to bathe the Kohanim as they prepare to assume their role as the Kohanim of the Bais Hamikdash. There is a mystery here and one may call it the mystery of the missing pants. Because we know that the Begadim of the Kohanim included pants (Michnasayim) and yet when you read the Parsha it says the following. In the beginning of Perek 8 in Posuk 6 it says (וַיִּקְרַב מֹשֶׁה, אֶת-אַהֲרֹן וְאֶת-בָּנָיו) Moshe brings Aharon and his children (בָּמִים) and he bathes them. Posuk 7 continues (וַיִּתֵּן עֲלֵיהֶם אֶת-הַכֹּהֲנָיִם, וַיַּחְגֵּר אֹתוֹ בְּאַבְנֵט, וַיִּלְבַּשׁ אֹתוֹ אֶת-הַמְעִיל, וַיִּתֵּן עֲלָיו אֶת-וַיִּשֶׂם עָלָיו, אֶת-הַחֹשֶׁן; וַיַּחְגֵּר אֹתוֹ, בְּחֹשֶׁב הָאָפֶד, וַיִּאָּפֶד לוֹ, בּוֹ וַיִּשֶׂם אֶת-הַמְצַנְפֹת, עָלָיו). Posuk 8 continues (וַיִּשֶׂם אֶת-הַמְצַנְפֹת, עָלָיו). Posuk 9 continues (וַיִּשֶׂם אֶת-הַמְצַנְפֹת, עָלָיו). This is three Pesukim which painstakingly goes through the different Begadim which Aharon Hakohen wore as Kohen Gadol and it is missing the Michnasayim, the pants. Later when Moshe Rabbeinu is commanded to prepare Kohen Hedyot his nephews, the Kohanim that were not Kohanim Gedolim as it says in Posuk 13 (וַיַּחְגֵּר אֹתָם אֲבָנֵט) they wore shirts (וַיִּקְרַב מֹשֶׁה אֶת-בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן, וַיִּלְבַּשֵׁם כְּתוּנֹת) and their belt (the Gartel) (וַיַּחְבֵּשׁ לָהֶם, מִגְּבָעוֹת) and hats. Again it doesn't mention pants.

Rav Yaakov in the Emes L'yaakov back on Parshas Tetzaveh (page # 333 on 28:41) makes the point of taking notice of the fact that consistently in the Torah there is a Lashon Nekiya, a Lashon of Tzniyus. The Torah doesn't mention dressing people in pants because it is not a fine Lashon (language). Although it is not a Davar Ha'assur, there is no prohibition in talking about these things, nevertheless the Torah is teaching us that from the fineness of the language of the way a person talks, a person would understand on his own to avoid this type of discussion.

Rav Yaakov sends us to Parshas Acharei Mos in 16:4 (on page # 373) and there it talks about Aharon Hakohen coming to do the Avoda on Yom Hakippurim and it says the following (כְּתוּנַת-בִּד קָדֵשׁ יִלְבַּשׁ) he should dress himself in a Yom Kippur shirt (וּמִכְנָסֵי-בִד יִהְיֶה עַל-בְּשָׂרוֹ) and pants of linen should be on his flesh (וַיַּחְבֵּשׁ בִּד יִהְיֶה) he should dress himself with a Gartel (וַיִּבְרָא מְצַנְפֹת בִּד יִצְנִיף) and with a proper hat. The hat, gartel, and shirt are mentioned in the language of (יִלְבַּשׁ) dress it conjures up the image of him dressing. The pants however, it doesn't say Umichnisai Bad Yilbush as it says by the other three, it says (וּמִכְנָסֵי-בִד יִהְיֶה עַל-בְּשָׂרוֹ), the pants should already be on his body. As if to say don't conjure up an image of a person any other way. And so, this is one of the lessons in the Darcei Hatzniyus.

Rav Yaakov mentions that he is not sure if Moshe Rabbeinu actually dressed the Kohanim in pants and it is just not mentioned in the Posuk or if they dressed themselves in Michnasayim. Others discuss this as well. The point is, that for fineness of language, to speak in a way that is appropriate the Torah doesn't clarify this point.

The Maharal writes regarding Elisha who was known by his host as a holy man and the Gemara asks in Maseches Berachos 10b (23 lines from the bottom) (וְתֹאמַר אֵל אִישָׁה הֲנֵה נָא יִדְעָתִי כִּי אִישׁ אֱלֹקִים קָדוֹשׁ הוּא א"ר יוֹסִי בַר חֲנִינָא) (מִכַּאֲן שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה מִכְרַת בְּאוֹרְחֵי יוֹתֵר מִן הָאִישׁ קָדוֹשׁ הוּא מִנָּא יִדְעָה רַב וּשְׂמוּאֵל חַד אָמַר (שְׁלָא רֵאתָה זָבוּב עוֹבֵר עַל שׁוֹלְחָנָה) how could they tell? The Gemara answers that there were a number of things that they noticed about him. One of them was that a fly would not disturb him. The Maharal says what is the significance of a fly not disturbing him? Because a person with a pure Neshama, with a Neshama that has a fineness of spirituality is disgusted by insects. It is something that is hard to explain in absolute terms. Nevertheless, there are things in this world that are Tzoya (not clean). Not not clean because Halachically they are not clean, just not clean in the Holech Yeilech of the fineness of the spirit of a human being. That is something that we take notice of and certainly something that we try to take notice of when we talk. And so, that is the first lesson of this Parsha.

2. In the beginning of the Parsha we have (צוֹ אֶת-אַהֲרֹן וְאֶת-בָּנָיו). Many Meforshim take note of the fact that throughout the Chumash Vayikra it only says Bnei Aharon not Aharon by name, consistently it says Bnei Aharon. I believe the Ramban says that because Aharon sinned at the Eigel he is not mentioned directly, just as Bnei Aharon. The Ramban takes notice of the fact that here it is different.

I would like to share with you the Pshat of Rav Yonason Eibeshutz in the Divrei Yonason and there he says a technical answer as to why it never mentions Aharon directly only the family directly and here it says (צוֹ אֶת-אַהֲרֹן וְאֶת-בָּנָיו). He says the following. There is a Posuk in Amos 5:25 (הֲזִכְרִיתִי וּמִנְחָה לִי בַמִּדְבָּר הֲבִיאתֶם-לִי בְּמִדְבָּר) did you bring a Korban or a Mincha to me in the Midbar? The Mizrahi in Shemos 30:16 explains that during the time Klal Yisrael was in the Midbar they brought only Korban Olos. There was never a need for a Chatas or Asham. Those sins were not committed. They brought straight the Korban Olas Hatamid, that was their Korban and of course the Mussafin, the appropriate Korbanos based on the time of the year. But as far as regular Korbanos it was just Olos. Says Rav Yonason Eibeshutz this is Mirumaz here. It always says Bnei Aharon when we are talking about Shelamim, Chatas, and Asham. It is talking about Bnei Aharon because Aharon himself only lived in the Midbar, he never brought those Korbanos. However, in this week's Parsha where it talks about (זֹאת תִּזְרֹת הַעֹלָה) the Korban Olah that Aharon himself had a hand in physically. Therefore, it says (צוֹ אֶת-אַהֲרֹן וְאֶת-בָּנָיו). Very nice Vort, a technical answer to a Shinui Hakra, a change in the language in the Pesukim.

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Pesach Expenses

Halachic Musings

By Rabbi Yair Hoffman

A colleague recently mentioned that their total family food bill for Pesach amounts to some \$6,000.

While it is correct that one should have more delicacies on yomtov than on Shabbos on account of the obligation of simcha (see Magen Avraham 529:4), this statement brought up three reactions:

1. "You are in serious need of budgeting. Perhaps you might consider cutting down on the fish and meats and maybe start cooking some macaro—no, that is chametz. But perhaps start preparing some less-expensive food items."
2. "Wait, in the Gemara (Beitzah 16b) it states: "Lavu alai v'ani porei'a—borrow on Me and I shall pay back." Rav Tachlifa explains that every person's income is determined from Rosh Hashanah. Whoever adds to the outlays for Shabbos, yom tov, and talmud Torah expenses, they will add to him. Whoever detracts from them, they will detract from him."
3. "It would be worthwhile to see what the parameters are in the mefarshim and poskim to this statement of Chazal."

Meaning Of The Dictum

Generally speaking, Rav Tachlifa's dictum means that whatever you are to spend on Shabbos and yom tov is not deducted from the income you were destined to earn that year. This is Rashi's explanation. For example, if you were destined to earn \$150,000 that year and you spent \$6,000 on Pesach, you will either earn \$156,000 that year or your expenses for that year will be \$6,000 less.

What Days Does It

Apply To?

The Gemara tells us that it applies to both Shabbos and yomtov. Is it more inclusive than this? The Yerushalmi and Pesikta D'Rav Kahana (#27) both add rosh chodesh and chol ha'moed. The Ritva, however, extends it to all mitzvos. Why does it only say Shabbos and yom tov? According to the Ritva, these are the more common examples. Rav Chaim Kanievsky (She'eilas Rav, page 29), however, explains that it does not apply to Chanukah and Purim. Seemingly, he disagrees with the Ritva. And one chassidishrebbe explains that it even applies to travel expenses incurred to go to the kever of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in Meron on Lag B'Omer!

Receiving Charity:

Six Answers

How does this notion of spending on Shabbos and yomtov fit with Rabbi Akiva's dictum to make your Sabbath like a weekday and not come to take charity from others? Tosfos in Beitzah (15b) poses the apparent contradiction between the idea of "Lavuv alai v'ani porei'a—borrow on Me and I shall pay back" and make your Sabbath a weekday and do not come to take charity.

There are a number of answers to this question, each of them yielding a different understanding of the underlying issues.

1. Tosfos (Beitzah) answer that Rabbi Akiva's answer is only if someone does not have, "mimal'farnes"—the resources to pay it back. If he does have the resources to eventually pay back, then he should spend more on Shabbos.

2. The Vilna Gaon has an entirely different text within the Tosfos. Instead of "mima l'farnes" he has the text "mimi lilvos" from whom to borrow. In other words, according to the Vilna Gaon, as long as he has a source from which to borrow, he should do so. Nonetheless, Rav Nissim Karelitz (Chut Sheini Vol. I 1:2) writes that even according to the Vilna Gaon he should only borrow what would be a meal fit for him, and he may not borrow in order to have a meal fit for Shlomo HaMelech.

3. The Meiri answers Tosfos' question in a remarkably innovative manner. He writes that, "Borrow on Me and I will pay back" and the idea of Shabbos expenses only refer to the wine of Kiddush, but not to the other expenses. Rabbi Akiva's statement does not apply to wine. This Meiri is highly innovative and does not seem to have been accepted by the latter poskim.

4. A fourth explanation is that although the person will get back the money, he should not spend it for Shabbos if he will not be liquid enough not to take from charity in the interim. (Toras HaRishonim Pesachim 112a).

5. Tosfos (Bava Basra 9a, ShabbosNosnin) answers that the dictum of Rabbi Akiva only means that one should not start taking charity solely on account of Shabbos meals, but if one is already taking charity then one can add the Shabbos-meal expenses. Thus the dictum of Rabbi Akiva does not negate the idea of Shabbos meals being a "free expense."

6. The Chofetz Chaim explains the position of the ShulchanAruch (242:1) that Rabbi Akiva was only referring to someone who had enough for two meals on Shabbos. He should not take charity for a third meal. However, someone who does not have enough food for two meals should take charity. Also someone who has enough food for three meals should also extend himself on account of Shabbos. It is possible that the source of this ruling is from Tosfos in Bava Basra (9a) that someone who has 14 meals for that week should not take from charity.

The halachah would follow this last opinion (#6) which severely limits the dictum of Rabbi Akiva to someone who can barely make it, cannot afford three meals for Shabbos, and has not yet taken charity.

A New Caveat

The Chazon Ish's opinion (cited in Imrei Yosher, Shabbos page 157) is that the dictum that all Shabbos expenses are covered only works for one who truly believes it, but if one doubts the dictum, the funds do not get returned.

What Types Of Spending?

Can any person decide that they will purchase Chilean sea bass, veal ribs, and rack of lamb for each meal and still have it "not count" in the money he normally would earn? Is that \$30-per-pound machmirim shemurah matzah also included?

Rav Elyashiv, zt'l, is of the opinion (Shvus Yitzchak Chashmal, p. 188 cited in Miluim to the Dirshu Mishnah Berurah, p. 72) that only food items that one would use during an important meal during the week are included. Thus if one would not serve Chilean sea bass or rack of lamb during the week, even for an important meal, then it is not deductible as a Shabbos or yom tov expense. Rav Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg (see Zichrom Dror Yikra, p. 375) is of the same opinion.

Rav Chaim Kanievsky's opinion is slightly more nuanced. His position (She'eilas Rav, p. 377) is that the more expensive foods are included in the dictum of the Gemara but that one should not buy excessively expensive foods. It should only be to the point where it is not noticed that his table is lacking anything.

Where To Purchase From?

At times, a more local convenience store sells staple items at a much higher price, but shopping for it takes considerably less time. When one is in a rush on an erev Shabbos, is the extra expense of the convenience store covered by Rabbi Tachlifa's dictum?

This author had posed this question to Rav Dovid Feinstein, shlita, once, who responded that the criterion was whether one would purchase that item at the convenience store during the week. If so, then the dictum of Rabbi Tachlifa would still apply. If the item is so extravagant that he would not purchase it during the week, then he may not consider it a covered expense on Shabbos as well. This also seems to be the indication of the Rambam's wording (HilchosShabbos 30:7).

Is It Just For Food?

What about a new custom-made \$4,000 Dini sheitel (Monsey) or a \$5,000 Ralph's (Manhattan) or a \$4,000 shtreimel from Miller's in Boro Park? Are these also included in the concept of Shabbos expenses are free?

The Rivevos Ephraim (Vol. I #181) cites Rav Moshe Feinstein as being of the opinion that clothing that is specifically designated for Shabbos and yomtov use is also included in Rav Tachlifa's dictum. Heat and air-conditioning expenses would thus be included as well. If one carefully examines the wording of the Rav Shulchan Aruch (OC 242:3), it seems that hotzaos, other types of expenses, are included aside from tikum ma'achalim, foods.

The costs involved in building a sukkah would almost certainly be included as well. The same question would arise in terms of going away to a Shabbos bar mitzvah, and paying for the hotel bill. Would this be included in Rabbi Tachlifa's dictum?

It seems that these items would be included in Shabbos expenses are free—if they fit into Rav Feinstein's criterion above. Another opinion—that of the Eishel Avraham (Siman 242, Rav Avraham Dovid Wahrman of Botshash 1770–1840)—is that Rav Tachlifa's dictum applies only to the minimum foods, but not to excess purchases. Thus, according to this view, the Dini or Ralph's sheitel and the Miller's shtreimel would not be covered. Nor would the Chilean sea bass, the rack of lamb, and the veal ribs.

It is interesting to note that Rav Shlomo Kluger writes (Sefer HaChaim Siman 242) that obtaining Shabbos clothing is even more important than food for Shabbos because it is more public. Rav Kluger writes that Rabbi Akiva's dictum of "make your Shabbos a weekday and do not rely on charity" does not apply to Shabbos clothing! This author believes, however, that the wording of Rabbeinu Chananel in Pesachim 112a seems to indicate not like Rav Kluger's explanation.

How To Become Wealthy

One last thought. It is well known that Hillel was poor (see Yuma 35b) and Shammai was wealthy. How did Shammai gain his wealth? The Imrei Emes (see Lekutei Yehudah, p. 64) explains that Shammai would always purchase

every item for the sake and honor of Shabbos. If he found a better one later on, he would switch that item. Hillel, on the hand, would utilize the principle of bitachon and he would make his Shabbos purchases toward the end of the week. The Imrei Emes explains that perhaps Shammai gained his wealth from the method in which he approached Shabbos purchases. Since everything he bought was l'kavod Shabbos, there was no cost involved. Even though later, when he found something better for Shabbos, he would eat the original purchase during the week, it was still not included in his yearly expenses since initially it was purchased for Shabbos.

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Thanks to hamelaket@gmail.com for collecting the following items:

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Weekly Blog :: Rabbi Berel Wein

Shabat Hagadol

The Shabbat that immediately precedes the holiday of Passover carries with it the title of being Shabbat Hagadol – the great and exalted Shabbat. There are many explanations advanced as to why this Shabbat should merit that special title. The one most often advanced is that the tenth day of Nissan – the day when the actual redemption from Egypt began by the Jews taking the paschal lamb into their possession – fell on the Shabbat before the actual exit from Egypt.

This traditional explanation has always been found somewhat wanting and many other explanations have been advanced over the centuries. It is said that once the door has been opened for the great, then even the small may also enter. Therefore I am taking advantage of this opportunity to offer my own idea regarding Shabbat Hagadol.

The rabbis taught us that every generation has people who expound ideas on Torah subjects that are relative to the issues and mindset of that particular generation and environment. In fact, the task of the Torah scholar and communal leader is to show and teach the relevance of the eternal Torah to the particular circumstances and events of the present time.

I feel that Shabbat Hagadol has special significance and importance to our current situation in the general and Jewish worlds. Shabbat Hagadol represents the prelude to redemption, the beginning of the process, the bumpy ride that comes before the smooth highway and the ultimate goal of freedom, liberty, security and spiritual attainment.

I am not a kabbalist or philosopher. I would not hazard to say that this is the immediate pre-messianic time or that it is not. Far greater people than I are involved in such discussions, which until now have come to no resolution. But I do feel that any rational observer of the Jewish world currently senses a volatility..... a feeling of change that dominates and makes obsolete old programs and policies.

After over a millennia of teeming Jewish life, scholarship and community on the European continent, it is now obvious to all that as far as Jews are concerned, Europe is done. The State of Israel, surrounded by enemies, violence, political turmoil and engulfed in its own internal divisions and societal conflicts, thrives and grows.

It is interesting and perhaps even disturbing to note that the current diplomatic conflict between Israel and the United States administration occupies more media space and comment than any other current topic. It is ludicrous to think that our little state, the size of New Jersey and with a population approximately perhaps equaling that of New York City should argue on equal terms with the country of the size, strength and population of the United States of America.

But that is exactly what is happening before our eyes. Europe, the United States, the Moslem world, are all engaged in momentous sociological, diplomatic and technological change. Our world is one that would be completely unrecognizable to the generation of our great grandparents. This great wave of change, of uncertainty and danger, of fear and optimism combined, is the Shabbat Hagadol of our current generation. It is the prelude to better times leading to Jewish and human redemption.

I think that all sections of the Jewish world recognize this fact. Some sections react to it by redoubling their efforts to hold onto the past, sanctifying the bathwater and not only the baby. Others wish to plunge headlong into the future, but because events and consequences are unforeseen, their policies and struggles may in the end tend to be meaningless.

Shabbat Hagadol should serve as a stabilizing rudder in the rough seas that we sail upon. For Shabbat, in all of its greatness, serves to face forward and yet look back at one and the same time. It ends the week and begins the week for us. That is why it is hagadol – great beyond all days and holy beyond all ordinary concepts. It begins the process of redemption within all of us and points towards the ultimate deliverance of Israel and of all of humankind.

Without the passage through Shabbat Hagadol there can be no Passover. For the achievement of freedom and liberty, of holiness and purpose, of sanctity and uniqueness is a process and not an instantaneous sudden event. We are in the midst of such a process that forces us to rethink our past and to somehow chart a course of action, thought and belief for our future.

The holiday of Passover, which will be soon upon us, will give us time and opportunity to reflect on what Shabbat Hagadol has taught us. There is no greater “greatness” than being realistic while anticipating miraculous events. We shall yet live to see that “as in the past days of the Exodus from Egypt, so shall I show you miracles once again.”

Shabbat shalom

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Weekly Parsha Blog:: Rabbi Berel

Tzav

The entire book of Vayikra is described in rabbinic literature as Torat Kohanim – the laws, instructions, rituals and duties of Aharon and his sons, the founders of the priestly family of Israel. In this week’s Torah reading, Moshe is instructed to command Aharon regarding the daily sacrifices to be offered in the Mishkan/Tabernacle and the keeping of eternal fire that always was to be present on the holy altar.

Aharon and his sons were chosen for special status and dutiful service on behalf of Israel and the Creator. The question arises, why was Aharon, his family and descendants so chosen? We will find later in the Torah that Moshe will be accused of nepotism regarding the choice of his brother and nephews for the priestly clan of Israel.

The Torah itself advances no explanation for the role of the priests in Jewish life and Temple service. It also does not disclose any reason or motive for the choice of Aharon and his family to serve in an exclusive fashion as these priests and officiants in the services of the Mishkan/Tabernacle and later in the Temple in Jerusalem.

However, almost in a passing note in his commentary to the Torah reading of Tetzaveh, Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra states that Aharon was chosen, not so much for his own merit, so to speak, but rather because he married Elisheva, the sister of Nachshon and thus became part of that family. And, the merits of that family were absorbed by him and made him the most fitting candidate for becoming the High Priest of Israel.

Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra never disappoints in his original and intuitive interpretations of the Torah. Nachshon is the symbol of personal risk and sacrifice on behalf of the survival of the Jewish people. Tradition has him jumping into Yam Suf before the waters split in order to enable the Jewish people to escape the slavery of Pharaoh and their ultimate annihilation.

Nachshon will be the leader of the tribe of Judah, arguably the most important of the tribes of Israel and he will be the first of the leaders of the tribes to bring a voluntary offering and gift to the Mishkan/Tabernacle on the day of its dedication and consecration. It is this trait of sacrifice and public service that is most obviously necessary for the role of being the High Priest of Israel and safeguarding the Temple service for all generations.

Aharon requires the example and influence of Nachshon in order to fulfill his own vital role in Jewish life. Moshe is able to command Aharon as to the

obligations incumbent upon him in the performance of his duties as the High Priest of Israel, due to the spirit of public sacrifice imbued within him by the merit of being part of the family of Nachshon.

This is truly a remarkable insight and teaches us how important apparently extraneous issues and matters such as family relations are to our lives and to the roles that the Lord has chosen for us to fulfill in Jewish public life. We should never minimize the importance of our influence, even in an indirect fashion, upon others and upon the course of Jewish society.
Shabbat shalom

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Ohr Somayach :: Torah Weekly :: Parshat Tzav

For the week ending 28 March 2015 / 8 Nisan 5775

by Rabbi Yaakov Asher Sinclair - www.seasonsofthemoon.com

Insights

The Constant Fire

"A constant fire shall burn upon the altar; it shall never go out." (6:6)

Throughout their journeys in the wilderness, the Jewish People carried with them the Mishkan. The word Mishkan comes from the word in Hebrew which means "to dwell." Through the Mishkan, G-d caused the Divine Presence, the Shechina, to dwell amongst the Jewish People.

There was an altar in the courtyard of the Mishkan. On it burned three different fires. On the eastern side of the altar was the maracha gadola, the "large arrangement". On this largest fire, the korbanot sacrifices were offered. On the southwestern corner there was another fire that was used solely to ignite the pyre of the golden altar inside the Mishkan on which the incense was burned.

And there was a third fire which had no fixed place, but could be made anywhere on the outside altar. This fire had one purpose and one purpose only. To fulfill the words of the Torah in this week's portion, "A constant fire shall burn upon the altar; it shall never go out." Come rain or shine, weekdays and Shabbat, this fire never went out. It burned all the forty years that the Jewish People were traveling in the desert. In fact, it burned without interruption for a total of over one hundred years: in the desert, fourteen years in the Mishkan at Gilgal, and fifty-seven years in the Mishkan at Nov and at Givon. Two pieces of wood had to be added to the fire twice a day, in the morning at the time of the morning offering, and in the afternoon at the time of the afternoon offering.

One might ask, "Why were three fires necessary? Wouldn't one have sufficed?"

These three fires can be understood as three aspects of our relationship with G-d.

The large fire represents our external service — the performance of the mitzvot and our prayers to G-d at the established times throughout the day and throughout the year. Because it was the largest fire, it was the most visible, just as our external duties as Jews are the most visible, be they the giving of charity or the care of the orphan and the widow. These are things that are as visible as a large fire.

However, there was another fire whose function outside was for no other purpose than to kindle an internal fire. That fire teaches us that we must take our exterior service and use it to kindle the interior fire. That internal fire represents the duties of the heart — our belief and trust in G-d and our constant striving to be better people. That's something you can't see from the outside, but like the incense that is burned on the golden altar, it emerges from within a person with a scent that is unmistakable.

The third fire can be moved anywhere, but it must never go out. This represents the undying fidelity of the Jewish People to G-d throughout our long and difficult Diaspora. Even though we have had to move from one corner of the world to another, our devotion to G-d has never been extinguished by an unkind world. Whether in the light of morning, or the impending darkness of approaching night, throughout our long history the

Jewish People have always been dedicated to the kindling on the altar of our devotion to G-d.

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Rabbi Weinreb's Parsha Column

Tzav, Shabbat HaGadol: "The Open Curtain"

As a pulpit rabbi, I maintained that mine was the busiest profession. Eventually, I conceded that other professions were equally busy. But I continued to insist that the rabbi's busy days are unique, for he is constantly faced with conflicting emotions.

The average rabbi may begin his day attending a happy event; a brit (circumcision). There, he shares in the special joy of welcoming a new child. There is a feeling of warmth between him and the parents of the newborn, and he glows with pride along with the grandparents. But he takes his leave before the ceremonial meal begins. He must be off to his next appointment. Often he must shift from joy to grief. The next family he meets has just lost a loved one, perhaps under especially tragic circumstances. He must assist with the details of arranging the funeral and burial, but he dare not allow his preoccupation with those details to detract from the sensitive task of consoling the inconsolable and showing compassion to the bereaved. The rabbi's day alternates from one extreme emotion to another, from one set of demands to a contrasting set of responsibilities. Sometimes, he must deal with ideologies diametrically opposed to his own. Let me tell you about one such day in my own experience.

I had scheduled a meeting that I knew would be uncomfortable for me. I had often met with clergy of other faiths, although I have always been guided by the teachings of those of my mentors who discouraged interfaith dialogue on theological matters. But I have sought to work cooperatively with spiritual leaders of other faiths on matters of social welfare. I learned, though, that it is hard to draw a firm boundary between theological matters and social concerns.

That morning, during my prayers, I asked the Almighty to somehow spare me the trials of theological confrontations at the meeting. My "backup" prayer was that He help me tackle whatever theological discussions did arise with wisdom and tact.

My anxieties soon proved to be justified. The announced agenda was to plan to oppose municipal legislation that would permit gambling in our community. However, the conversation soon turned to the Bible. My discomfort increased when the focus narrowed to one specific biblical narrative: the story of the Binding of Isaac. I knew the differences between the manner in which Jewish tradition and Christian teachings each interpret the story. But the discussion was unavoidable, and I did my best to present the Jewish point of view.

Eventually, the conversation returned to the agenda, and we did commit to jointly oppose the proposed municipal legislation. But I left the meeting recommitted to my profound belief that Judaism and Christianity differ profoundly and fundamentally from each other.

After that morning's discomfort, I looked forward to my afternoon, during which I planned to prepare the daily page of Talmud to teach a group of my constituents dedicated to a program known as Daf Yomi, which aims to complete the voluminous corpus of Jewish law, known as the Talmud, in seven-and-a-half years by unflinchingly studying one folio page every day. Little did I know that the discussion stimulated by that day's page would bear upon the differences between the Jewish faith and other religious perspectives.

That day we were to study page 55 in the tractate Zevachim. This tome deals with laws pertaining to the ritual sacrifices in the Holy Temple. The biblical basis of these laws is found in this week's Torah portion, Parshat Tzav (Leviticus 6:1-8:36). There, we learn about a variety of voluntary sacrifices

that individuals can offer: the olah, a burnt offering totally consumed by fire upon the altar; the mincha, a meal offering composed of flour and oil and frankincense; and the shelamim, in which some sections of the sacrificial animal are placed upon the altar, but other portions are distributed to the priests and to the donors of the sacrifice to be eaten by them.

We had already been studying this particular tractate for almost two months when we reached page 55. We were familiar with the many differences between the aforementioned sacrifices, including the fascinating fact that the olah and mincha could be offered by non-Jews, whereas the shelamim could not. Many reasons are offered for this distinction. I had shared with the class a reason that I personally favored, based upon the thinking of early 20th century rabbi and mystic, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook.

Rabbi Kook wrote, "The world's many cultures cannot comprehend how matters of the flesh can be considered sacred. They struggle with the concept that physical tasks can be intrinsically spiritual." Other cultures can readily accept that a sacrifice which is totally consumed upon the altar can be an act of worship. But that ordinary people, the donors of a particular sacrificial offering, can sit down to a festive meal, eat and enjoy the food, and in the process perform a sacred act of worship—that is totally alien and unacceptable to them. Only one who identifies with the teachings of the Jewish tradition, in which all physical activities, no matter how mundane, are infused with holiness, can appreciate that partaking in a delicious meal in the company of one's family and friends is sublimely spiritual.

Part of that day's lecture dealt with the requirement that the magnificent doors separating the area of the altar from the central Temple chamber, or heichal, must be opened before the shelamim sacrifice can commence. While preparing for that day's lecture, I encountered an interesting dispute between the two major commentators on the Talmudic page: Rashi and Tosafot. Rashi maintains that only for the shelamim must these doors remain open. They did not have to remain open for other sacrifices. Tosafot disagree and maintain that this requirement was true for all sacrifices. Interestingly, Maimonides sides with Rashi.

I suggested to the class that the approach of Rashi and Maimonides was consistent with Rabbi Kook's thinking. The open doors of the heichal were symbolic of the connection which exists in Judaism, and arguably only in Judaism, between that most sacred inner chamber of the Temple in which the Divine Presence was centered and the outer world in which ordinary humans share sacrificial flesh. The open doors symbolize the absence of barriers between the sacred and the profane.

When I began to deliver my lecture that afternoon, I was struck by the contrast between my early morning theological discussions with Catholic priests and my Talmudic musings later that day. But as I continued to teach, I realized that these two experiences were but two sides of the same coin. In the morning, and in the afternoon, I was actually making the same point, albeit to two very different audiences. I was doing my job as a rabbi, teaching that Judaism is unique in its understanding of biblical passages, and also unique in its insistence that one did not have to abstain from physical pleasure in order to reach spiritual heights.

The one lesson that distinguishes Judaism from other religions it is this: Holiness and daily affairs may occupy separate compartments, but the doors between them must remain open.

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Britain's Former Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks

Violence and the Sacred

Why sacrifices? To be sure, they have not been part of the life of Judaism since the destruction of the Second Temple, almost 2,000 years ago. But why, if they are a means to an end, did God choose this end? This is, of course, one of the deepest questions in Judaism, and there are many answers. Here I want explore just one, first given by the early fifteenth century Jewish

thinker, R. Joseph Albo, in his *Sefer ha-Ikkarim* (The Book of Principles, 1425).[1]

Albo's theory took as its starting point, not sacrifices but two other intriguing questions. The first: Why, after the flood, did God permit human beings to eat meat? (Gen. 9: 3-5). Initially, neither human beings nor animals had been meat-eaters (Gen. 1: 29-30). What caused God, as it were, to change His mind? The second: What was wrong with the first act of sacrifice — Cain's offering of "some of the fruits of the soil" (Gen. 4:3-5). God's rejection of that offering led directly to the first murder, when Cain killed Abel. What was at stake in the difference between Cain and Abel as to how to bring a gift to God?

Albo's theory is this. Killing animals for food is inherently wrong. It involves taking the life of a sentient being to satisfy our needs. Cain knew this. He believed there was a strong kinship between man and the animals. That is why he offered, not an animal sacrifice, but a vegetable one (his error, according to Albo, is that he should have brought fruit, not vegetables — the highest, not the lowest, of non-meat produce). Abel, by contrast, believed that there was a qualitative difference between man and the animals. Had God not told the first humans: "Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves in the ground"? That is why he brought an animal sacrifice. Once Cain saw that Abel's sacrifice had been accepted while his own was not, he reasoned thus. If God (who forbids us to kill animals for food) permits and even favours killing an animal as a sacrifice, and if (as Cain believed) there is no ultimate difference between human beings and animals, then I shall offer the very highest living being as a sacrifice to God, namely my brother Abel. Cain killed Abel as a human sacrifice

That is why God permitted meat-eating after the flood. Before the flood, the world had been "filled with violence". Perhaps violence is an inherent part of human nature. If there were to be a humanity at all, God would have to lower his demands of mankind. Let them kill animals, He said, rather than kill human beings — the one form of life that is not only God's creation but also God's image. Hence the otherwise almost unintelligible sequence of verses after Noah and his family emerge on dry land:

Then Noah built an altar to the Lord and, taking some of all the clean animals and clean birds, he sacrificed burnt offerings on it. The Lord smelled the pleasing aroma and said in his heart, "Never again will I curse the ground because of man, even though every inclination of his heart is evil from childhood . . . Then God blessed Noah and his sons, saying to them . . . "Everything that lives and moves will be food for you. Just as I gave you the green plants, I now give you everything . . .

Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God, has God made man." (Gen. 8: 29 – 9: 6)

According to Albo the logic of the passage is clear. Noah offers an animal sacrifice in thanksgiving for having survived the flood. God sees that human beings need this way of expressing themselves. They are genetically predisposed to violence ("every inclination of his heart is evil from childhood"). If, therefore, society is to survive, human beings need to be able to direct their violence toward non-human animals, whether as food or sacrificial offering. The crucial ethical line to be drawn is between human and non-human. The permission to kill animals is accompanied by an absolute prohibition against killing human beings ("for in the image of God, has God made man").

It is not that God approves of killing animals, whether for sacrifice or food, but that to forbid this to human beings, given their genetic predisposition to violence, is utopian. It is not for now but for the end of days. In the meanwhile, the least bad solution is to let people kill animals rather than murder their fellow humans. Animal sacrifices are a concession to human nature (on why God never chooses to change human nature. [2] Sacrifices are a substitute for violence directed against mankind.

The contemporary thinker who has done most to revive this understanding (without, however, referring to Albo or the Jewish tradition) is René Girard, in such books as *Violence and the Sacred*, *The Scapegoat*, and *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*. The common denominator in sacrifices, he argues, is: . . . internal violence — all the dissensions, rivalries,

jealousies, and quarrels within the community that the sacrifices are designed to suppress. The purpose of the sacrifice is to restore harmony to the community, to reinforce the social fabric. Everything else derives from that.[3]

The worst form of violence within and between societies is vengeance, “an interminable, infinitely repetitive process”. Hillel (whom Girard also does not quote) said, on seeing a human skull floating on water, “Because you drowned others, they drowned you, and those who drowned you will in the end themselves be drowned” (Avot 2: 7).

Sacrifices are one way of diverting the destructive energy of revenge. Why then do modern societies not practice sacrifice? Because, argues Girard, there is another way of displacing vengeance:

Vengeance is a vicious circle whose effect on primitive societies can only be surmised. For us the circle has been broken. We owe our good fortune to one of our social institutions above all: our judicial system, which serves to deflect the menace of vengeance. The system does not suppress vengeance; rather, it effectively limits itself to a single act of reprisal, enacted by a sovereign authority specializing in this particular function. The decisions of the judiciary are invariably presented as the final word on vengeance.[4] Not only does Girard’s theory re-affirm the view of Albo. It also helps us understand the profound insight of the prophets and of Judaism as a whole. Sacrifices are not ends in themselves, but part of the Torah’s programme to construct a world redeemed from the otherwise interminable cycle of revenge. The other part of that programme, and God’s greatest desire, is a world governed by justice. That, we recall, was His first charge to Abraham, to “instruct his children and his household after him to keep the way of the Lord by doing what is right and just” (Gen. 18: 19).

Have we therefore moved beyond that stage in human history in which animal sacrifices have a point? Has justice become a powerful enough reality that we no longer need religious rituals to divert the violence between human beings? Would that it were so. In his book *The Warrior’s Honour* (1997), Michael Ignatieff tries to understand the wave of ethnic conflict and violence (Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Rwanda) that has scarred the face of humanity since the end of the Cold War. What happened to the liberal dream of “the end of history”? His words go to the very heart of the new world disorder: The chief moral obstacle in the path of reconciliation is the desire for revenge. Now, revenge is commonly regarded as a low and unworthy emotion, and because it is regarded as such, its deep moral hold on people is rarely understood. But revenge – morally considered – is a desire to keep faith with the dead, to honour their memory by taking up their cause where they left off. Revenge keeps faith between generations . . .

This cycle of intergenerational recrimination has no logical end . . . But it is the very impossibility of intergenerational vengeance that locks communities into the compulsion to repeat . . .

Reconciliation has no chance against vengeance unless it respects the emotions that sustain vengeance, unless it can replace the respect entailed in vengeance with rituals in which communities once at war learn to mourn their dead together. [5]

Far from speaking to an age long gone and forgotten, the laws of sacrifice tell us three things as important now as then: first, violence is still part of human nature, never more dangerous than when combined with an ethic of revenge; second, rather than denying its existence, we must find ways of redirecting it so that it does not claim yet more human sacrifices; third, that the only ultimate alternative to sacrifices, animal or human, is the one first propounded millennia ago by the prophets of ancient Israel. No one put it better than Amos:

Even though you bring Me burnt offerings and offerings of grain,
I will not accept them . . .

But let justice roll down like a river,
And righteousness like a never-failing stream (Amos 5: 23-24)

[1] Rabbi Joseph Albo, *Sefer HaKkarim* III:15.

[2] On why God never chooses to change human nature, see Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed*, Book III, ch. 32.

[3] René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 8.

[4] *Ibid.*, 15.

[5] Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, 188-190.

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Rabbi Ari Kahn on Parsha

Matzah and Chametz

The concepts of leavened and unleavened bread are familiar to us from the holiday of Passover, but we tend to focus on the physical or technical aspects that differentiate them from one another. However, Jewish tradition goes far beyond the physics of the dough itself, and seeks out the deeper symbolism of hametz and matzah.

Talmudic teachings regarding Passover associate leavened bread with the evil inclination:[1] The difference between leavened bread, hametz, and matzah, the unleavened “bread of poverty,” is that bread is puffed up, indicating haughtiness or pride. And yet, this teaching leads to some unavoidable questions: If bread is associated with negative attributes, why should it ever be allowed? Why not require that we eat only unleavened bread all year round? Alternatively, we may ask, why is Passover specifically the time to prohibit leavened bread? While we can easily understand the obligation to eat matzah to commemorate our hasty departure from Egypt, we should have no difficulty imagining that this symbolic food might co-exist with leavened bread. In other words, why prohibit bread simply because we are obligated to eat matzah?

In order to address these questions, we would do well to broaden our scope to include another festival that is intrinsically linked to Passover: Shavuot, the Festival of Weeks. While the Exodus from Egypt serves as the catalyst for the prohibition of bread, we are commanded to count seven weeks, and on the fiftieth day to celebrate Shavuot, thus creating an unbreakable chronological link between the two holidays. While we may say that the primary link between Passover and Shavuot lies in their agricultural aspects, the theological, historical and symbolic aspects of these festivals are no less intertwined: Specifically on Shavuot, as opposed to every other day of the year, bread is included in the service and celebratory sacrifice in the Beit Hamikdash. Seen from this perspective, the link between Passover and Shavuot creates a continuum, shedding light on the questions we have raised regarding hametz and matzah, as it leads us from the prohibition of bread to the occasion on which leavened bread is brought into the Temple service. In fact, the Torah laws that govern the sacrifices brought throughout the year in the Beit HaMikdash bring our questions into even sharper focus: As a rule, other than the *Shte haLechem*, the two loaves that are an integral part of the service on Shavuot, bread was not allowed in the Temple or Temple service at all. This week’s parashah contains a clear statement of this prohibition:

Aharon and his descendants shall then eat the rest [of the offering]. It must be eaten as unleavened bread in a holy place. They must therefore eat it in the enclosure of the Tent of Meeting. It shall not be baked as leavened bread. I have given this to them as their portion in My fire offerings, and it is holy of holies, like the sin offering and the guilt offering. . . (Vayikra 6:9-10)

Other than the two loaves offered on Shavuot, there is only one other exception to the ban on leavened bread in the Temple, and it, too, is found in this week’s parashah:

And this is the law of the peace offering that is sacrificed to God: If it is offered as a thanksgiving offering, then it must be presented along with unleavened loaves mixed with oil, flat matzahs saturated with oil, and loaves made of a boiled mixture of flour and oil. The sacrifice shall also be presented along with loaves of leavened bread; all these shall be brought with one’s thanksgiving peace offering. (Vayikra 7:11-13)

This unique combination of breads is offered in thanksgiving: When an individual feels that his or her life has been spared through Divine intervention, when a personal catastrophe is averted and a person experiences personal salvation, they may bring this offering of gratitude to celebrate the peace they have been granted. It is specifically this thanksgiving "peace offering" that includes both leavened and unleavened bread.

We have learned two apparently independent laws, one regarding the unique service on Shavuot and one regarding the thanksgiving sacrifice; when we overlay these two laws, a fascinating observation emerges: The Passover experience, encompassing the paschal sacrifice, the matzah, even the seder itself, may be akin to a "thanksgiving" offering. If this is the case, we cannot help but notice that something is missing, and the thanksgiving is not complete: The leavened bread that is an integral part of the thanksgiving offering is not included in the celebration of Passover. Quite the opposite: Leavened bread is strictly prohibited throughout the entire festival, leading us to the conclusion that despite our feelings of thanksgiving and joy, we are really not quite completely free. The national and personal freedom that Passover celebrates is somehow lacking, hence the inclusion of leavened bread is inappropriate.

What is missing from the Passover story? Why is our celebration, and our offering, less than perfect? When the Jews left Egypt, they were politically free, yet they were spiritually limited. They were wrested from the depths of depraved Egyptian society, extricated from the world of idolatry and superstition, yet no other belief system had taken the place of the idolatry they left behind.

The prohibition of bread on Passover reminds us that leaving Egypt was not enough. Physical, political freedom is simply a means to an end; we are not truly free until we are given our mandate, until we accept our mission, until we appreciate the *raison d'être* for our liberation from Egypt. Only when we stood at Sinai and accepted the Torah was our liberation complete. As we celebrate Passover, we mark a time when we were still a humble nation of emancipated slaves who had not yet achieved true freedom. Only after accepting the Torah, after accepting our new marching orders, after accepting the loftiest mission given to humankind, was there place for pride. Only on Shavuot can we celebrate and give thanks for our complete freedom and take pride in our partnership with God, a partnership designed to elevate and transform the world. On Shavuot, we complete our thanksgiving, adding the two loaves of leavened bread that were missing on Passover. This sort of celebration, in which we complete our offering of thanksgiving, is reserved for those who enjoy true freedom. Celebrating anything less is a shallow celebration of mediocrity.

[1] Talmud Bavli Brachot 17a, and commentary of Rashi.

For a more in-depth analysis see:

<http://arikahn.blogspot.co.il/2015/03/audio-and-essays-parashat-tzav.html>

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Rabbi Zvi Sobolofsky

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Kashering our Utensils and our Hearts

Kashering utensils has always been an integral part of Pesach preparation. As we prepare our kitchens for the upcoming celebration of Pesach, the deeper lessons behind these intricate laws can guide us in our service of Hashem throughout the year. These halachos are derived from parshas Matos and parshas Tzav. It is not coincidental that we read the pesukim about kashering the Shabbos before Pesach; it is a time to delve into the halachic and hashkafic messages of this area of pre-Pesach preparation.

Chazal derive that there are two fundamentally different ways to kasher, one known as hagala and the other as libun. Hagala is the kashering through boiling water, whereas libun uses an actual flame. We are taught in Maseches Avodah Zara that the appropriate method to use depends upon

how the non-kosher or chametz food initially entered into the utensil. The halachic principles of *k'bolvo kach polto* - how it was absorbed is how it can be removed - governs the laws of kashering. For example, a utensil such as a grill which absorbed taste through use with a direct flame cannot be removed of this absorption by mere boiling water.

The imagery of applying different degrees of heat to remove non-kosher or chametz can be applied in a similar way to the process of teshuva. When negative actions and thoughts become a part of ones being, teshuva requires a similar degree of effort to remove them and thereby "kasher" ones soul. Sins that were committed with less enthusiasm and thereby didn't penetrate as deeply into ones being can be atoned for by a teshuva process commensurate with the original actions. These which entered with more intensity require a greater degree of "heat" to be removed; as powerful as the sin was, so must the teshuva be effective.

In parshas Tzav we are taught that a *kli cheres* - an earthenware vessel - cannot be kashered. Earthenware is so porous that once a taste has absorbed into its walls it can never be totally removed. However, this limitation only applies to kashering by hagala, but libun is effective even on earthenware.

Tosfos (Pesachim 30b) explain that although taste absorbed in earthenware can never completely be removed, the process of libun is equivalent to remaking the utensil. Since these vessels are originally formed in a furnace, the libun process mimics this and therefore suffices to kasher earthenware.

The remaking of a vessel that is permeated with non-kosher taste serves as a model for teshuva. Chazal speak of a person changing his name when doing teshuva, since by doing so he demonstrates that he is a new person. When teshuva for specific sins is not sufficient, an entire transformation is necessary. Tosfos describes libun as, "*na'aseh kli chadash* - a new utensil has been made." A complete teshuva requires an entirely new outlook on life.

When one purchases utensils from a non-Jew, in addition to kashering those which were previously used one must immerse them in a mikva. Just as utensils undergo a process of purification in a physical mikva before being usable, a soul must be immersed in the symbolic water of Torah. The halachic details of *tevila* which require a complete immersion and necessitate removal of *chatzitzos* - barriers that separate between the utensil and the water of the mikva - are similarly present in a symbolic way in the *tevila* in the waters of Torah. A total immersion in Torah study without any barriers completes the process of purification of one's soul.

As we clean and kasher our homes for Pesach, let us look inward and prepare our hearts and souls in sanctity and purity.

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Rabbi Shmuel Rabinowitz

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Parshat Tzav: Distinguishing Between The Important And The Unimportant

Rabbi Shmuel Rabinowitz

03/26/2015

We must be careful not to fulfill mitzvot externally, and be able to distinguish between the important and the unimportant.

Parashat Tzav, the Torah portion which we read this week, deals mainly in halachot (Jewish laws) pertaining to sacrifices. The detailed instructions express how seriously the Torah looks at the work in the Temple. We will examine one of the halachot that appears in the parsha which conveys an important message for every generation in every period.

The halacha is called "*pigul*" and says as follows: Every sacrifice that is meant to be eaten is limited in two ways - in the time of eating and in the place of eating. There are sacrifices that can be eaten in one day and others that can be eaten in two days. There are sacrifices that can only be eaten in the Temple complex, and others that can be eaten anywhere in the city of Jerusalem. The mitzva of *pigul* says that if during the time of sacrificing the sacrifice, the kohen (the priest) thought of eating the sacrifice past the time permitted or outside of the permitted space - the sacrifice is disqualified, not permitted. It is important to note that the halacha teaches us that even if

ultimately the sacrifice was eaten according to halacha, in the permitted time and place, it is still disqualified due to the initial thought – “the pigul thought.”

This is an unusual halacha among the mitzvot of the Torah. Usually, Judaism does not place such importance on thought, but rather it focuses on correct and incorrect deeds. For example, a person who gives charity, even if he intends to gain notoriety as a philanthropist or to attain social status, gets credit for the mitzva. Likewise, a person who eats matza on Passover, even if he eats it because he likes the taste, as long as he knows that he is fulfilling the mitzva – the mitzva is fulfilled.

Regarding the halachot of sacrifices, however, thought becomes critical. An incorrect or inexact thought can nullify the sacrifice. And of course, we must ask – why is this so? What is so special about sacrifices that they require such accurate thought? History has taught us the reason for the importance of thought in the work in the Temple. Several times we find the prophets of Israel in the Bible warning of wrong attitudes toward the Temple and sacrifices, an attitude that made the ritual act the more important one and ignored the significance and messages that G-d wanted us to internalize through the mitzvot.

Here, for example, was the warning given by the Prophet Micha: “With what shall I come before the Lord... Shall I come before Him with burnt offerings, with yearling calves? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, with myriad streams of oil?... He has told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord demands of you; but to do justice, to love loving-kindness, and to walk discreetly with your G-d.” (Micha 6:6-8) Here, and in many other places, the prophets look at the work in the Temple and see that it became external and ritualistic in ways that do not suitably reflect the values of Judaism. Do justice, love loving-kindness, walk discreetly – these are the values in which Judaism believes. When the work in the Temple is done correctly, it expresses these values and even advances them. However, veering away from the exact process of work in the Temple easily turns it into ritual lacking in content which ultimately leads to man seeing G-d, heaven forbid, as some kind of hungry idol figure...

Since this danger exists, we find many halachot in the Torah relating to sacrifices, and the serious attitude toward even the slightest deviation, even one done merely in thought.

Even we, who have not had a Temple or sacrifices for thousands of years, are not immune to this danger.

We must be careful not to fulfill mitzvot externally, and be able to distinguish between the important and the unimportant. Internalization of the values of justice, charity and discretion – this is really what G-d asks of us.

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Rav Kook on the Torah Portion

Tzav: The Purifying Fire of the Olah

"This is the law of the olah, the burnt offering. It is the burnt-offering which remains on the altar's hearth all night, until morning." (Lev. 6:2)

What is the significance of burning the olah offering throughout the night?

Elevating the Soul

The central ceremony when offering a korban is zerikat ha-dam, as blood from the offering is dashed around the foundation of the altar. What is the meaning of this ritual?

Blood corresponds to the nefesh - our soul, our life-force. "For blood is the nefesh" (Deut. 12:23). Dashing the blood on the altar fulfills the primary goal of the offering, purifying the soul and expiating its offenses - "It is the blood that atones for the soul" (Lev. 17:11). This service elevates the foundations of the nefesh.

However, there is a level below the nefesh, a lower life-force residing closer to the body and its functions. This level of life also needs to be elevated. We seek to refine even our lowest physical tendencies and traits. This refinement is attained through a deep yearning to be close to God - an aspiration that flows through the entire nation by way of the holy avodah of the Temple. For this reason, the verse emphasizes: "hi ha-olah" - "It is the [same] offering." The same olah offering which elevates and ennobles the nefesh also refines our baser character traits. The soul is uplifted through zerikat ha-dam, when the blood is dashed around the altar. The lower life-force is elevated when the limbs of the offering are consumed in the altar's fire. The holy fire refines and purifies our physical nature.

Why burn the offering at night?

During the night, the physical side is dominant and the soul's higher light is hidden. During this time of spiritual dormancy, the altar's fire burns and purifies the physical remains of the offering. This nocturnal service guards life from sinking into the depths of base materialism.

The offering is burnt until daybreak. With the arrival of morning, the soul awakens with all of its strength and light. It is ready to stand before God, alive and vibrant, in renewed splendor.

(Adapted from Olat Re'iyah vol. I, p. 122)

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By Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

Mizmor Lesodah, Parshas Tzav and Erev Pesach

By Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

Question #1: Korban Todah or bensching Goimel?

“Which is the better way to thank Hashem for a personal salvation, by reciting birchas hagomeil, or by making a seudas hodaah?”

Question #2: Bringing home the bread!

“Why is the korban todah accompanied by so many loaves of bread and so much matzoh?”

Question #3: Mizmor Lesodah and Pesach

“I recently assumed a position teaching in a small town day school. Before Pesach, I mentioned that we do not recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev and Chol Hamoed Pesach. One of the students afterwards told me that this is not his family minhag, but only Ashkenazi practice. Is he correct?”

Answer:

Although Chapter 100 of Tehillim is known by its opening words as Mizmor Lesodah, there actually are two different chapters of Tehillim, #100 and #107, that devote themselves to the thanksgiving acknowledgement of someone who has survived a major physical challenge. In Psalm 107, Dovid Hamelech describes four different types of treacherous predicaments: traveling through the desert, traveling overseas, illness, and imprisonment, in which a person would pray to Hashem for salvation. When the person survives the travails and thanks Hashem, the following passage reflects this thanks, Yodu lashem chasdo venifle'osav livnei adam, “they acknowledge thanks to Hashem for His kindness and His wondrous deeds for mankind.” These words are repeated four times, once after each of the situations is described.

The Gemara cites this Psalm as the source for many of the laws of birchas hagomeil, the brocha we recite when surviving these calamities. Actually, someone who survived these predicaments should offer a korban todah, which is described in parshas Tzav. The birchas hagomeil is recited in place of the korban todah that we cannot bring, since, unfortunately, our Beis Hamikdash lies in ruin (Rosh, Brachos 9:3; Tur, Orach Chayim 219).

What are the unusual features of the korban todah?

The korban todah is a specialized variety of shelamim, whose name means, according to the Toras Kohanim, that it creates peace in the world, since the owner, the kohen and the mizbeiach (the altar) all share in consuming it (quoted by Rashi, Vayikra 3:1). A shelamim, which was perhaps the most common korban in the Beis Hamikdash, was offered to express the desire to

draw closer to Hashem from a sense that one lacks nothing in his physical life (see Commentary of Rav Hirsch, Vayikra 3:1).

The korban todah is offered following the general procedures and rules of a shelamim; however, it has several unique features. The first is that the korban itself is accompanied by a huge amount of bread, called korbanos mincha (plural, menachos), a total of forty loaves. Thirty of these comprise ten loaves each of three varieties of matzoh. However, the remaining ten loaves are highly unusual: first of all they are chometz, and this is the only instance of a private korban that includes chometz. (There is only one other korban any time that is chometz, and that is the two loaves offered by the community on Shavuot.) As a result, the korban todah could not be offered on Erev Pesach or on Pesach itself.

The chometz loaves are unusual in another way, in that each of them is three times the volume of the matzoh loaves (see Menachos 76b). Thus, the ten chometz loaves were, together, of equal size to the thirty matzohs.

Of the four varieties of mincha that accompany the korban todah, one of each type of loaf is given to the kohen to take home and consume together with his family and friends. The other 36 loaves are given to the offerer of the korban.

There is another unusual facet of the korban todah offering. Whereas a korban shelamim may be eaten until nightfall of the next day after it is offered, the korban todah must be eaten before the morning after it was offered, a much shorter period of time. Chazal further shortened the time it may be eaten -- permitting it to be eaten only until halachic midnight -- to assure that no one eat the korban when it is forbidden.

Thus, there are two ways in which the korban todah is treated differently from an ordinary shelamim: The todah is accompanied by an absolutely huge amount of bread, made from a total of twenty isronim of flour, which is twenty times the amount of flour that requires one to separate challah. Half of this bread is chometz and half matzoh, and it must be consumed within a very short period of time.

Why would the Torah “impose” these additional requirements on the offerer of the korban? Well, let us figure out what is he going to do. He has a significant amount of holy meat that must be eaten by midnight, and a huge amount of accompanying bread with the same restrictions. What will he do? Presumably, he invites a large crowd to join him in his feast and thereby explains to them the reason for his repast. Thus, we increase the appreciation of others for the thanksgiving that Hashem has provided him. This now leads us directly into our discussion of the chapter of Tehillim that begins with the words Mizmor Lesodah.

Mizmor Lesodah

Whereas the abovementioned Chapter 107 of Tehillim describes the background behind korban todah and birchas hagomeil, the 100th chapter of Tehillim, Mizmor Lesodah, represents the actual praise that the saved person recites. Although only five verses long, this psalm, one of the eleven written by Moshe Rabbeinu (see Rashi ad locum), captivates the emotion of a person who has just survived a major ordeal. The first verse expresses the need for everyone on Earth to recognize Hashem, certainly something that conveys the emotions of someone very recently saved from a major tribulation. The second verse shares the same passion, since it calls upon everyone to serve Hashem in gladness and to appear before Him in jubilation. The third sentence continues this idea. In it, the thankful person who has been saved calls on everyone to recognize that Hashem is the personal G-d of every individual, and that we are His people and the sheep of his pasture. He then calls on all to enter into Hashem’s gates and His courts, so that we can thank and bless Him. We should note that the gates of the Beis Hamikdash were meant for all of mankind, not only the Jewish People, as specifically included in Shlomoh Hamelech’s prayer while inaugurating it (Melachim I 8:41-43).

The closing sentence is also very significant: “For Hashem is good, His kindness is forever, and our trust should be placed in Him in every future generation.” (We should note that the word *olam* in Tanach means “forever” and never means “world,” which is a meaning given to this word by Chazal. The most common Tanach word for “world” is *teiveil*; see, for example, Tehillim 19:5; 33:8; and 90:2; all of which are recited during the pesukei

dezimra of Shabbos and 96:10, 13; 97:4; 98:7, which are part of kabbalas Shabbos.) The celebrant calls upon those he has assembled to spread the message that Hashem is the only Source of all good, and that we should recognize this at all times, not only in the extraordinary situations where we see the manifestation of His presence!

We can now understand better why the Mizmor Lesodah chapter of Tehillim is structured as it is. It provides the beneficiary of Hashem’s miracle with a *drosha* to present at the seudas *hodaah* that he makes with all the bread and meat that he does not want to go to waste -- complete with encouragement to others to internalize our thanks to Hashem.

Clearly, then, this psalm was meant to be recited by the thankful person, and this is his invitation to others to join him as he thanks Hashem. The Avudraham notes that Hashem’s name appears four times in the psalm, corresponding to the four people who need to thank Him for their salvation. Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos

We find a dispute among early authorities whether one should recite Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos (Shibbolei Haleket, quoted by Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 281). Why should this be?

Since the korban todah is a voluntary offering, it cannot be offered on Shabbos. The Tur mentions that established custom is to omit Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos and Yom Tov, out of concern that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, someone may mistakenly offer the korban todah on these days. On Shabbos, of course, it is prohibited to offer any korban other than the required daily tamid and the special Shabbos korbanos, whereas on Yom Tov one may offer only korbanos that are brought because of Yom Tov (Beitzah 19b).

The Tur does not agree that this is a valid reason to omit reciting Mizmor Lesodah on these days, contending that we need not be concerned that people will mistakenly offer a korban todah on Shabbos or Yom Tov (Orach Chayim, Chapter 51 and Chapter 281). Others explain that we recite Mizmor Lesodah to remind us of the korban todah, and since it was not offered on these days, there is no point in reciting it (see Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 51:11). Perhaps this is done as an aspect of *uneshalma parim sefaseinu* (Hoshea 14:3), “may our lips replace the bulls (of offerings),” which is interpreted to mean that when we have no Beis Hamikdash, we recite passages that commemorate those offerings. For this reason, the custom developed among Ashkenazim to omit Mizmor Lesodah on days that the offering could not be brought in the Beis Hamikdash.

Mizmor Lesodah on Chol Hamoed Pesach

Since the korban todah contained chometz, it could not be offered on Pesach. Therefore, Ashkenazim refrain from reciting Mizmor Lesodah is omitted on Chol Hamoed Pesach for the same reason that it is omitted on Shabbos.

Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Pesach

Ashkenazic custom is to omit Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Yom Kippur and on Erev Pesach. The korban todah and its breads can usually be eaten until the midnight after the day it was offered. However, were one to offer a korban todah early on Erev Yom Kippur or on Erev Pesach, its chometz may be eaten for only a few hours. Since one may not offer a korban whose time limit is curtailed, one may not offer korban todah on these days, and, following Ashkenazic practice, Mizmor Lesodah is omitted then, also. The common custom among Sefardim is to recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Yom Kippur, Erev Pesach and Chol Hamoed Pesach (Pri Chodosh 429:2; Kaf Hachayim 51:51-52).

With this background, I can now begin to address the third question raised above.

“I recently assumed a position teaching in a small town day school. Before Pesach, I mentioned that we do not recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev and Chol Hamoed Pesach. One of the students afterwards told me that this is not his family minhag, but only Ashkenazi practice. Is he correct?”

Indeed, in this instance, the student is correct. Hopefully, the rebbe was not that badly embarrassed.

Mizmor Lesodah and our daily davening

In order to make sure that this thanks to Hashem takes place daily, the chapter of Mizmor Lesodah was introduced into our daily pesukei dezimra.

We should remember that miracles happen to us daily, even when we do not realize it (quoted in name of Sefer Nehora; see also Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 281). Although it was not part of the original structure of the daily prayers established by the Anshei Keneses Hagedolah, long before the time of the Rishonim it was already common practice to include it as part of the daily recital of pesukei dezimra and to say it almost at the beginning. The importance of reciting this psalm should not be underestimated. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 51:9), states: One should recite Mizmor Lesodah with song, since eventually all songs will cease except for Mizmor Lesodah. This statement of Chazal is explained by Rav Hirsch (Commentary to Psalm 100) in the following manner: One day in the future, everything on Earth will be so ideal that there will be no reason to supplicate Hashem for changes. Even then, prayers of gratitude and thanksgiving will still be appropriate.

https://www.ou.org/jewish_action/03/2015/whats-the-truth-about-the-sale-of-chametz-on-pesach/

Orthodox Union / www.ou.org

What's the Truth about . . . the Sale of Chametz on Pesach?

JA Mag/ March 9, 2015

Misconception: Along with chametz food that one sells to his rabbi, one also sells chametzdik dishes for the duration of Pesach.

Fact: The rabbi does not buy the chametz but merely acts as an agent in the sale to a non-Jew. Dishes are usually not included in the sale.

Background: There are several prohibitions surrounding chametz (“leaven”) on Pesach. In addition to the prohibitions of eating and benefitting from chametz during Pesach, there are two Biblical prohibitions which one violates merely by possessing chametz over Passover: bal yira’eh and bal yimatzei—chametz shall not be seen nor found in one’s possession during Pesach (based on Shemot 12:19 and 13:7). There is also a positive commandment to dispose of one’s chametz on Passover eve (based on Shemot 12:15). Finally, post-Pesach there is a rabbinic prohibition against benefitting from chametz that was owned by a Jew during Pesach.

In order to comply with these injunctions, two methods of disposing of chametz are traditionally employed. The method used throughout much of history (when most people did not have pantries laden with food) was simply to destroy all of one’s chametz, preferably by burning. Out of the concern that one may not be aware of all extant chametz, Chazal instituted a search (bedikah) before destroying (biur) any found remnants of chametz. A second method used is bitul, a technical nullification of the chametz by which one declares his chametz to be ownerless and like the dust of the earth. In theory, either of these methods—biur or bitul—would suffice to avoid the Biblical prohibitions; in practice, both are used (Magen Avraham 431:2). Whatever method(s) is used, it must be carried out before the fifth halachic hour on Passover eve (Pesachim 21a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 434:2).1

It would seem that an equally valid solution is to give or sell the chametz to a non-Jew.² That is exactly what Rabbi advised Yochanan of Chakukaah to do with someone else’s chametz for which he was responsible (Pesachim 13a). That Talmudic story involves a standard, irrevocable sale in which a non-Jew pays full market value for the chametz, takes it home and uses it.

A typical mechirat chametz today differs in that the non-Jewish buyer gives only a small down payment, leaves the chametz in the Jewish individual’s house and after Pesach ownership is transferred back to the original owner.³ The earliest source for such a transaction is the Tosefta (Pesachim 2:6), which records that a Jew on a boat may sell or give his chametz to a non-Jewish shipmate and buy it back after Pesach.⁴ This is codified by Rambam (Hilchot Chametz U’Matzah 4:6) and the Shulchan Aruch (OC 448:3). The Beit Yosef (OC 448:4) notes that selling chametz before Pesach and buying it back afterward constitutes ha’arama (subterfuge) but is nonetheless permitted as long as there was no ab initio condition that the non-Jew is obligated to sell it back.

The procedure used today for mechirat chametz developed in various stages.⁵ Originally, the sale of chametz was like any other sale, as described above. Later, it became common to include an unwritten agreement that the

non-Jewish buyer would sell the chametz back after Pesach. Over time, as more Jews found themselves with considerable quantities of chametz on erev Pesach, it became impractical to physically transfer the chametz,⁶ and non-Jewish buyers became reluctant to lay out such large sums of money. One reason for this development was that Jews in medieval Europe were not permitted to own land. Thus, some got involved in selling beer. Had they been required to destroy their entire stock before Pesach, their businesses would have been ruined. At this point, rabbis began arranging sales for individual merchants. The sales were formal, but the chametz would remain in the Jewish-owned warehouses and the non-Jewish buyers would pay a fraction of the authentic value, leaving the remainder as a loan; after Pesach, the Jewish business owners would buy their merchandise back.

This method presented a new problem: how to deal with chametz that remained in the Jewish owner’s home or property. In the original method, the buyer removed the chametz from the Jewish individual’s house (Terumat Hadeshen 120) so that it should not appear that he has responsibility for it (MA, OC 448:4). Moreover, this way he would not come to accidentally eat it (Shu”t Radbaz 1:240). The Bach (OC 448:2) approved selling one’s stock of beer in conjunction with an innovation—together with the beer, the storeroom had to be sold or leased to the non-Jewish buyer.⁷ This phase lasted from about the early seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century when the final innovation was introduced.

The final stage in the development of mechirat chametz is more or less what exists today: a rabbi arranges a general sale of the chametz for the members of his community. In this sale, the non-Jew does not take possession, does not pay the full value of the chametz and he sells it back after Pesach. This mass sale is only about 200 years old and was originally opposed by many authorities who viewed it as blatant ha’arama. It has since been widely accepted and is normative practice today.⁸ Rabbinic authorities continue to modify various aspects, ensuring that the transaction is a legal and fully binding sale, and not a mere formality.⁹ It has become so accepted that the Mishnah Berurah (433:23) even suggests selling certain areas in one’s home that may be too difficult to check for chametz.

Now that we explored the background of mechirat chametz, we must ask,¹⁰ what must be sold? Clearly, there is no need to sell kitniyot (legumes), whose consumption is only forbidden by Ashkenazic custom.¹¹

Some authorities prefer not to sell pure chametz (e.g., bread, pasta; see Haggadat Minchat Asher, Sha’arei Teshuvah:1). Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (Rabbi Hershel Schachter, Nefesh HaRav [Jerusalem, 1994], 177) advised his students and the congregants of the Moriah Shul in the Upper West Side of Manhattan not to sell pure chametz but only mixtures containing chametz. The Gra did not sell chametz unless it was a permanent sale (Ma’aseh Rav, no. 180) and advised not buying items after Pesach that had been sold (Ma’aseh Rav, no. 181). Rabbi Moshe Feinstein advised his grandson not to sell pure chametz (Masoret Moshe [5773], 147). Through his shul rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichot Shlomo 135-138 and Shalmei Moed 321) performed the custom of mechirat chametz, but stated that ideally one should consume all of the actual chametz in one’s house before Pesach. He maintained that selling chametz is completely valid and that one could buy chametz after Pesach even from stores owned by irreligious Jews. He had a personal chumrah of not eating sold chametz but insisted others should not follow that practice.

The Tzitz Eliezer (20:51[2]) views the sale of actual chametz as halachically acceptable. Others note that it is preferable not to buy chametz before Pesach in order to then sell it so that they will have chametz available immediately after Pesach (Shevet Halevi 4:49).

Regarding chametzdik utensils,¹² there are three categories of concern: “adhered chametz” (that is, chametz that tends to harden and to adhere to a surface such as the insides of pans, pots and cooking utensils), absorbed chametz and the utensil itself.

The Shulchan Aruch and Rema (OC 442:11) discuss kneading bowls and flour bins which are difficult to clean and, due to the quantity of chametz that invariably remains even after a thorough cleaning, recommend giving these utensils away as a gift to a non-Jew before Pesach, with the

understanding that they will be returned after Pesach. The current practice is to sell “adhered chametz” since it is actual chametz.¹³

Generally, authorities do not find it necessary to sell absorbed chametz, and one would not violate the prohibitions of *bal yira'eh* and *bal yimatzei* with absorbed chametz. However, some halachic authorities, such as the Steipler, explicitly included absorbed chametz in the sale contract.¹⁴

The utensils themselves present more of a challenge. The question of what to do with chametzdik, non-kasherable dishes is discussed in the gemara (Pesachim 30a). Rav rules that all chametzdik utensils must be destroyed and may not be used after Pesach.¹⁵ Shmuel disagrees and maintains that they may be used after Passover. The halachah follows Shmuel, and the Shulchan Aruch states (OC 451:1) that there is no need to sell or otherwise dispose of one's chametzdik utensils. They simply need to be scrubbed clean of any visible chametz and locked away. After Pesach they may be used. The common practice is thus not to sell dishes. Such dishes, however, may not be used for food preparation on Pesach—not even for cold food (Rema, OC 451:1). They may be used for non-food purposes (Rema, OC 450:7) and sold to a non-Jew on Pesach (Shoneh Halachot 450:12). The discussion above pertains to chametzdik dishes; vessels that do not contain any absorbed chametz but are merely being used to store chametz are often sold in the contract used for mechirat chametz, similar to the way warehouses that store chametz are sold.¹⁶

Lest one desire to be overly stringent, selling dishes may result in an additional obligation—one would have to immerse the dishes in a mikvah upon repossessing them, as all metal and glass utensils acquired from a non-Jew¹⁷ require immersion.

A significant dissenting opinion is the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Rav Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the first Lubavitcher Rebbe). In his contract,¹⁸ he explicitly included the sale of those utensils that have actual chametz on them. The Lubavitch custom is thus to sell the utensils, but because the chametzdik utensils are never actually transferred to the non-Jewish buyer's domain, they do not require immersion once they are returned to the original owner.¹⁹ The Ben Ish Chai (Tzav: 9) also states that the utensils should be sold. This is not the standard practice.

The story is told²⁰ that on Motzaei Pesach 1933 the Chazon Ish had a dream in which he was told to immerse all of his pots. The next morning he found out that the rav through whom he had sold his chametz had erroneously sold the pots.²¹

The sale of chametz must be fully binding under Jewish law, and some authorities require that it meet local legal standards as well. It is a complex and technical transaction involving intricacies of Jewish commercial law in which an error can lead to the violation of two Biblical prohibitions. Thus, the custom has developed to have a communal sale administered by a competent and experienced rabbi. The way it is performed today, the rabbi serves as an agent²² to sell the chametz, but at no point does the rabbi own any of the chametz that he is selling on behalf of others.²³

Rabbi Dr. Ari Z. Zivotofsky is on the faculty of the Brain Science Program at Bar-Ilan University in Israel.

Notes

1. If a person travels and is in a different location than his chametz, this must be taken into account. The burning should take place before the bitul so one can perform the mitzvah with his own chametz (Rema, OC 434:2). Regarding the timing of the sale with respect to bitul, see *Minchat Yitzchak* 8:41.
2. According to Beit Shammai, this would not work, because all chametz owned by a Jew must be consumed or destroyed before Pesach (see Pesachim 21a). The mishnah (Pesachim 2:1) implies that the halachah is not like Beit Shammai.
3. On this modern sale, see: Rabbi Shmuel Eliezer Stern, *Mechirat Chametz K'hilchato* (Hebrew) (Bnei Brak, 5749); Rabbi Steven Gottlieb, “Mechirat Chametz,” *Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society* XXXI (5756): 94-116; Rabbi Shimon D. Eider, *A Summary of Halachos of Pesach* (Lakewood, 1980), 30-35 and Rabbi Baruch Simon, *Imrei Baruch* (New York, 5775), 273-283. Note that this complex topic is addressed by many posekim, and this is obviously not a comprehensive study.
4. The Tosefta includes the stipulations that it be a complete transfer and that it not be subterfuge. See *Tosefta k'Peshuta*, vol. 4, 494-6, for some of the opinions regarding these crucial stipulations.

5. For an excellent summary of the historical development and halachic issues of mechirat chametz, see Rav Shlomo Yosef Zevin, *HaMoadim B'Halacha* (Jerusalem, 1980), 294-304.

6. A related modern issue involves whether one must sell stocks one owns in companies that involve chametz. On this issue, see: *Melamed L'ho'il* I, OC: 91; *Shu"t Haelef Lecha Shlomo* 238; *Minchat Yitzchak* 3:1 and 7:26 and *Moadim u'Zemanim* 3:269 (which deals with improvements to make in the sale contract), n. 1.

7. This solved another halachic problem—the method of *kinyan* used to transfer ownership (MB 448:12, 17). To prevent one from accidentally eating from the chametz on Pesach, a token partition is erected around the sold chametz (SA, OC 440:2).

8. Rav Schachter (Be'Ikvei HaTzon [Jerusalem, 1997], 75) points out that mechirat chametz avoids the prohibitions but does not accomplish the positive commandment of destroying chametz. It is via the small amount that is left over and burnt that one fulfills the mitzvah of *tashbitu* (destroying one's chametz).

9. Rav Shalom Mordechai HaKohen Schwadron of Brezhan, “Dinei Mechirat Chametz,” in *Tcheilet Mordechai* (5746), vol. 3, 362, writes that the main thing is that the sale should not be conducted in a frivolous manner, because it is only with great difficulty that this sale was permitted by the rabbis (par. 91). The sale should be handled by a competent authority (par. 91-2) and the dishes should not be sold or they will require *tevilah* upon returning to the Jewish owner (par. 105).

The Chatam Sofer (*Shu"t* 1:OC:113 and 2:YD:310) supported the sale, and asserted that whoever questions it should be scolded. He maintained its validity even if the non-Jew had no intention of it being an actual sale, as long as it was done legally. Rav Moshe Feinstein confirmed the validity of the sale, even if the chametz belonged to a store owner who actually did business with the sold chametz on Pesach (*Iggerot Moshe*, OC 1:149).

10. Historically the Jews of Yemen did not avail themselves of this option. They fulfilled the Biblical edict of *tashbitu* without any creative solutions and simply removed all chametz from their possession before Pesach. If, by accident, someone was left with a large quantity of chametz, he would sell it outright to a non-Jew with no intent of repurchasing it after Pesach. Rabbi Yosef Kapach recommends that Yemenites continue to act in their traditional manner. (Rav Kapach to Rambam, *Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah* 2:3 and *Halichot Teiman*, 18). Regarding the Jews of Aden, a seaport city in Yemen, *Aggadata d'Pischa* claims they sold their chametz and even their dishes. However, according to *Otzar Minhagei Aden* (5773), 87-88, only businesses sold chametz but not chametzdik dishes or the dishes that were used to store chametz.

11. Some have suggested selling *kitniyot*, lest there be chametz mixed in (see Stern 4:5, p. 28).

12. See Stern, 4:6-8, pp. 28-29.

13. The contract used in Yerushalayim includes adhered chametz, absorbed chametz and nonglass and metal utensils. The Chatam Sofer's contract included adhered chametz but not absorbed chametz or utensils.

14. *Kraina d'Igrata*, 371-2. For an exchange of letters on this topic between the Steipler and Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, see Rav Avraham Dov Levin, *Seder Mechirat Chametz u'Mechirat b'Hamah ha'Mavkirah l'Goy k'Minhag Rabbanei Yerushalayim Ir Hakodesh* (5766), 43-48.

15. This was the practice among the Beta Yisrael Jews of Ethiopia, where most of the utensils were made of pottery.

16. See Stern, 7:16, p. 54.

17. For the many divergent opinions on this topic, see *Darkei Teshuvah*, *Yoreh Deah* 120:90; the long footnote in Rabbi Zvi Cohen's *Tevilat Keilim* 3:3; *Yabia Omer* 6, YD:11 and *Yechave Da'at* 3:24 (where Rav Ovadia Yosef asserts one should not sell utensils and rules that they require immersion if sold). The *Kitzur Shulchan Aruch* 114:2 also says not to sell utensils. Utensils made of material that do not require *tevilah* may be sold.

18. “*Hilchot Mechirat Chametz*,” found at the end of *Hilchot Pesach* (p. 234 in the 5773 ed.).

19. See the *sichah* from 1976 printed in *HaMaor* 54:2 (380): (March-April 2001): 3-5.

20. See Rabbi Shimon Finkelman, *The Chazon Ish: The Life and Ideals of Rabbi Avraham Yeshayah Karelitz* (New York, 1989), 57.

21. On the Chazon Ish's opinion that there is no need to sell chametzdik utensils and that sold utensils require *tevilah*, see *Emunah U'Bitachon* 3:8 and *Chazon Ish*, OC 117:15.

22. If someone authorized more than one rabbi to sell the chametz, it does not invalidate the sale (*Shu"t Minchat Yitzchak* 6:38).

23. This is relevant in a case where one dies between authorizing the rabbi to sell his chametz and the rabbi performing the sale (see Rav Yaakov Ariel, *B'Ohalah shel Torah* 2:59).

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