

INTERNET PARSHA SHEET
ON PESACH - 5758

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hamaayan@torah.org Hamaayan / The Torah Spring Edited by Shlomo Katz
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Moreinu Harav Gedaliah Hakohen ben Rivka shlita

The Four Cups The "arba kosot"/four cups of wine which we drink at the seder are traditionally associated with the four expressions of redemption in Shmot 6:6-7: "I shall take you out from under the burdens of Egypt; I shall rescue you from their service; I shall redeem you with an outstretched arm and with great judgments. I shall take you to Me as a people . . ." But why are there four different expressions for redemption? Also, why are these commemorated specifically with wine? R' Yitzchak Mirsky shlita explains (based on the writings of R' Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berlin "Netziv" z"l): The four expressions represent four phases of the Exodus. The first phase occurred after the fourth plague, when Bnei Yisrael were relieved of their back-breaking labor. At that point we read (Shmot 8:28), "Pharaoh hardened his heart this time also, and he did not send out the people." The redundant phrase, "he did not send out the people," indicates that he did not free them entirely, but, it implies, he lightened their burden. In the second phase of the redemption, Pharaoh began to respect his Jewish subjects. This occurred after the plague of hail, where Pharaoh refers for the first time to "Bnei Yisrael" (Shmot 9:35), rather than to "the people." The third phase was the actual Exodus. It will be noted that these three phases parallel, in reverse order, Hashem's prophecy to Avraham (Bereishit 15:13): "[1] Your descendants will be strangers in a land which is not theirs, and [2] they will enslave them and [3] oppress them." In the fourth phase, Hashem took us as His people. This refers to the giving of the Torah. Why wine? Netziv explains that wine is used because it changes a person's complexion just as the Exodus brought joy to the faces of our ancestors. (Haggadah Shel Pesach Hedyonei Halachah) ...

One year, at the seder of R' Shimon Sofer z"l (known as the "Michtav Sofer"), his grandson asked him the reason for stealing the afikoman. At first, the Michtav Sofer did not respond, but after the seder, he explained as follows: The Torah (Shmot 11:7) relates that as Hashem passed through Egypt killing the firstborn, not one dog belonging to a Jew barked. It seems strange, said the Michtav Sofer, that Chazal did not establish any remembrance for this miracle which the Torah troubles itself to mention. [Ed. Note: In contrast, we allude in the Haggadah to literally hundreds of miracles which the Torah does not mention at all.] In fact, said R' Sofer, stealing the afikoman is that remembrance. The gemara (Pesachim 113a) states that one is not permitted to live in a city that has no dogs. Rashi explains that the barking of dogs is a protection against thieves. It follows, therefore, that on Pesach night, when the dogs did not bark, there was a greater risk of thieves. We allude to this by stealing the afikoman. Why didn't R' Sofer answer his grandson until after the seder? It has been suggested that he sought to teach his grandson that a Jew must accept our Torah, mitzvot and customs even when he does not understand them. (Quoted in Vayaged Moshe; our thanks to the reader who e-mailed us this story) Hamaayan, Copyright (c) 1998 by Shlomo Katz and Project Genesis, Inc. Posted by Alan Broder, ajb@torah.org. Project Genesis: Torah on the Information Superhighway learn@torah.org 6810 Park Heights Ave. <http://www.torah.org/Baltimore>, MD 21215 (410) 358-9800 FAX: 358-9801

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Pesach 5758 by Rabbi Yaakov Asher Sinclair

If there's a top-ten list for the most abused words in the English
language, "freedom" must be up there near the top. To us, freedom means

B'S'D' driving a Porsche with the top down along a gently curving coast road on an endless summer day with no other cars for five miles in either direction. Freedom to us means flying around the world on an open air ticket first class; turning up at the airport and looking at the departure board and thinking where shall I go today, Machu Picchu or Nepal; Easter Island or the Outer Hebrides? Our definition of freedom has become indivisible from escapism. The archetype of freedom is the Exodus from Egypt which we commemorate in the festival of Pesach. The name for "Egypt" in Hebrew is "Mitzrayim" which is from the Hebrew word "metzar" meaning "narrow," or "constriction." Egypt was the ultimate place of constriction. No slave had ever escaped from there, let alone an entire nation. When the Torah talks about freedom it always connects it to a clear idea of the purpose of that freedom. Freedom without a purpose is slavery. When Moshe asks Pharaoh to let the Jews leave Mitzrayim, he says "Thus says Hashem: Let My people go - and they will serve Me." The second part of the statement is the reason for the first. The only reason we were redeemed from Egypt was so that we could serve Hashem. But why does Hashem need to be served? What does He get out of it? The answer is - nothing. We can give nothing to Hashem that He doesn't already have, because everything we have is His. However, when we serve Hashem it is we who benefit. When we serve Hashem we establish a relationship with Him. We connect ourselves to the only Reality that there is. True freedom is being yoked to the truth. To the extent that we connect ourselves to Hashem, we are connected to reality. This is the definition of freedom. To the extent that we allow ourselves to be drawn into the myriad of mental arcade games of escapism we disconnect ourselves from the Real World. Every Pesach we have a golden opportunity - a launch window - to connect with this reality, the reality of freedom. We tend to think of ourselves as being static in time and that time passes around and over us. We talk of someone as "time has passed him by." In reality, we are the time travelers. Time is fixed and we pass through it. Time has fixed points. Stations, if you like. I remember as a child my father once bought me a train set. It was the most beautiful train set in the world. (I think he spent half the night putting it together in time for my birthday.) It came complete with drivers and guards, and people waiting at stations with suitcases reading little miniature newspapers. But the train always ran in a circle. Over the bridge, through the tunnel, through the first station, across the level crossing with the cattle grid to the second station. Round and round, round and round. Time is like that toy train. We are passengers on a train which travels in an eternal circle. Every seven days, we go through a station called Shabbos. It's the same station. It's the same Shabbos. It's the same temporal landscape as last week; the same Shabbos as the first Shabbos of Creation. Similarly, every spring we revisit the train station called Pesach. It's the same Pesach as last year. It's the same as the first Pesach. Thus it contains all the power of freedom of that first Pesach. Its power is undiluted by the years. Because in reality, the years have not passed by. The same reality that existed then exists now. The Exodus from Egypt created a spiritual landscape which is the essence of this time of the year. It's in the air. All we need to do is to hook into it. We do this by fulfilling the mitzvot of the Seder. These are our tools by which we can hook into the power of freedom which is all around us. Look outside. The trees are blooming. The call of the dove is heard in our land. We must heed that call. That call of freedom. Each one of us has our own pressures, our own constrictions, our own little "portable Egypt" that we carry around inside ourselves. The message of Pesach is that we can escape from our narrow constriction. We can be free. We can start again. All we need to do is to hear the voice of the dove. To start anew. The word for spring in Hebrew is Aviv. The first two letters of the word Aviv are Aleph and Beis. We can go back to Aleph Beis. We can renew ourselves as before. As it says in the Haggadah: "Each person is obliged to see himself as if he actually came out of Egypt." Sources: Vesod VeShoresh Ha'emuna, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, as heard from Rabbi Mordechai Fishberg

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Shiur HaRav Soloveichik ZT"L on Haggadah Shel Pesach

(Shiur date: 3/27/62)

1. Source of Mitzvas Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim The Rambam (Hilchos Chametz Umatzoh 7:1) says that there is a positive commandment to retell the miracles that Hashem did for our forefathers on the 15th of Nissan as it says Zachor Es Hayom Hazez Asher Yetzase Mmitzrayim (remember this day that you left Egypt), similar to Zachor Es Yom Hashabbos Lkadsho (remember the Sabbath to sanctify it). Why does the Rambam make the comparison to Shabbos?

The Mechilta Drabbi Yishmael and Rashi derive the obligation of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim (to tell the stories of the exodus) from the verse Lmaan Tizkor Es Yom Tzascha Mayeretz Mitzrayim Kol Yemay Chayecha (and you shall recall the day that you left Egypt all the days of your life). The verse of Zachor Es Hayom Hazez Asher Yetzase Mmitzrayim is the source for the obligation to mention Yetzias Mitzrayim (exodus from Egypt) twice daily as part of Krias Shema. The Rambam derives the obligation to mention Yetzias Mitzrayim as part of Krias Shema from the verse Lmaan Tizkor, leaving the verse of Zachor Es Hayom Hazez for the purpose of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. Why do the Mechilta and Rashi derive the obligation from a different source than the Rambam? After all, the Mishna (Berachos 12b) that discusses the argument between Rabbi Eliezer Ben Azariah and the Chachamim regarding the interpretation of the verse of Lmaan Tizkor, where Rabbi Eliezer and Ben Zoma derive that we must mention Yetzias Mitzrayim by day and by night, appears to agree with the Rambam. Apparently Rashi and the Mechilta were of the opinion that the verse of Lmaan Tizkor is explanatory and not obligatory, that it explains the frequency with which the Mitzvah of Zachor Es Hayom Hazez is to be fulfilled.

The Rambam derived the Mitzvah of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim from the same source as the Mechilta Drabbi Shimon Bar Yochai . This Mechilta and the Rambam both refer to two obligations: that of Vhigadta Lbincha, and you will relate the stories of the exodus to your son, whether or not he asks you. This is the obligation to teach all children according to their capabilities. Zachor Es Hayom Hazez teaches us that even an individual must relate the stories of the exodus Bayno Lbayn Atzmo (to himself). Though the Rambam and Mechilta differ in the order in which they quote the verses, they agree that the main obligation to retell the stories of the Exodus on this night derives from Zachor Es Hayom Hazez and is supplemented with the verse of Vhigadta Lbincha.

The Rav asked where do we find that the word Zachor (remembering) means Sippur (telling a story)? Apparently this question bothered the Rambam as well. The words "like it says by Shabbos Zachor Es Yom Hashabbos Lkadsho" do not appear in the Mechilta: the Rambam added these on his own because he wanted to show how one finds the semantics of Sippur in the word Zachor. Rashi (Chumash) says that the word Zachor is to be translated as constant engagement in the act of remembering. One is obligated to constantly think about Shabbos, to anticipate it with great yearning. Rashi quotes the famous opinion of Beis Shamai that one should always put aside the best things for Shabbos. There is a constant obligation to think about Shabbos. The Rambam agrees with Rashi, and says that based on this obligation to always think of Shabbos, we refer to the days of the week as numbers relative to Shabbos (Mechilta). The Rambam asks what is the connection between Kiddush on Shabbos and Zachor Es Yom Hashabbos Lkadsho? The Rambam explains that the Mitzvah of Kiddush on Shabbos is the Peulas or Maaseh Mitzvah, the tangible action relative to the Mitzvah. The Kiyum Hamitzvah, the complete fulfillment of the Mitzvah, is accomplished when one has spent the previous week in anticipation of Shabbos and culminates his anticipation with Kiddush. Another example of the distinction between the Kiyum Hamitzvah and the Maaseh Hamitzvah is in prayer. There is a constant obligation to pray which is the Kiyum Blev (fulfillment through thought), yet the Maaseh Hamitzvah occurs when one prays 3 times daily. Another example is the obligation to constantly maintain the yoke of heaven, Ol Malchus Shamayim, however the Maaseh Hamitzvah happens twice daily with the recitation of Krias Shema. [The Rav explained that Shamor is interpreted in the same way: there is an obligation on Shabbos to constantly think about refraining from work and forbidden acts (the Kiyum Blev) in order that you should perform the Maaseh Mitzvah of Shevita (refraining from work).] The Rambam says that the example of Zachor Es Yom Hashabbos teaches me to interpret the Mitzvah of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim as requiring one to experience the events of the exodus. Bechal Dor Vadur means that in each generation each person must view himself as if he himself has just left Egypt with Moshe this moment. There is a Peulas Mitzvah on this night to relate the stories of the exodus, but there also is a Kiyum Mitzvah Blev, internal fulfillment of the obligation, to view ourselves as exiting Egypt this very moment. There is a vast difference between one who experiences the event first hand and one who retells a story second hand. Just like there is a Kiyum Blev to remember Shabbos all week that becomes tangible on Shabbos through Kiddush, on the night of Pesach there is an internal fulfillment to relive the exodus that becomes tangible through the recitation of the Haggadah.

We express the obligation to relive the events of the exodus at various points of the Haggadah. We relate to the exodus personally at the beginning of Maggid when we say that had Hashem not taken us out of Egypt we would have remained enslaved to Paroh. However at the conclusion of Maggid we say Lefikach, therefore we are obligated to praise Hashem, and we begin to recite Hallel. We could not recite Hallel at the start of Maggid because we have not yet relived the experiences of the exodus. In order to recite Hallel one must experience the miracles first hand. Only after we have related the stories and have come to view ourselves as participants in the great exodus from slavery can we recite Hallel. We recite the blessing of Asher Gealanu Vgaal Es Avosaynu (He who has redeemed us and redeemed our ancestors) at the conclusion of Maggid when we have become participants in the exodus. Only then have we attained Zachor, to experience it completely.

We now understand an enigmatic statement in the Haggadah, Yachol Marosh Chodesh etc. Why would I possibly think that the obligation to relive the experiences of the exodus should start with first day of the month of Nissan? After all, the Torah says Vhigadta Lbincha Bayom Hahu, and you shall relate to your son on that day, the 15th of Nissan, there is no written obligation to retell the story any earlier. However, based on the comparison of the obligation to retell the story on the night of Pesach to the Mitzvah of Zachor by Shabbos, we can understand this statement. Since there is a Kiyum Hamitzvah on Shabbos to begin thinking about Shabbos on the first day of the week, perhaps the same obligation exists to begin thinking about the special night of Pesach earlier, from the beginning of the month. The Beraysa (Tanaic statements) then says that even if we do not start at the beginning of the month, perhaps we should begin involving ourselves in at least a Kiyum Blev of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim on the fourteenth day of Nissan? The Haggadah tells us that Pesach is different than Shabbos in this regard, that we begin thinking about Pesach, the Kiyum Blev, the same

time that we perform the Peulas Hamitzvah. Only when we have Pesach, Matzoh and Maror in front of us, on the night of Pesach itself.

2. Kiddush on Shabbos and Pesach The concept of Zachor that is common to both Shabbos and Pesach expresses itself in Kiddush. What is Kiddush? The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:1) says that it is Zechiras Shevach V Kiddush (a remembrance of praise and sanctification). The Mitzvah of Shabbos is to express the uniqueness of the day of Shabbos: Mizmor Shir Lyom Hashabbos (to sing a song of praise to Hashem about the day of Shabbos). What is so special about Shabbos: Mah Yom Miyomayim? There aren't seven days in a week: there are six days and Shabbos. The equation of Zachor Es Hayom Hazez Asher Yetzase Mmitzrayim and Zachor Es Yom Hashabbos Lkadsho relates to this aspect of uniqueness. Just like Shabbos is different than all other days, Pesach night is different than all other nights of the entire year. Kiddush on the night of Pesach establishes the uniqueness of the night. Tosfos in Pesachim says that there is no Tosfos Yom Tov (extending the festival by starting earlier) for the night of Pesach and one may not recite Kiddush or eat Matzoh before nightfall. Many ask on Tosfos why doesn't the concept of Tosfos Yom Tov apply to Pesach as well? After all there is the well known Gemara that Rav would pray Tefilas Arvis Lshabbos and make Kiddush before sundown on Friday afternoon. Even if we do not permit the eating of Matzoh before the fifteenth of Nissan, which would require waiting till nightfall, why should we forbid the recitation of Kiddush before sundown? The answer is that we need 4 cups of wine on the night of Pesach. May someone recite Kiddush earlier and wait till nightfall to drink the cup of wine? Since Kiddush is a part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim he must wait till nightfall to include it as part of the Seder. The text of the Kiddush on Pesach night proves this point, as it mentions the memorial to the exodus from Egypt. Also, Tosfos opinion is that the 4 cups of wine are the medium through which Chazal instituted the various blessings and obligations related to the Seder. Drinking 4 cups of wine was not the main purpose of the Takannah (institution). The Gemara says that 4 cups of wine were instituted and they associated a Mitzvah with each one. All 4 cups of wine include some reference to Yetzias Mitzrayim, including the third cup recited over Bircas Hamazon and the fourth cup recited over Hallel. Kiddush on Pesach night, like Kiddush on Shabbos night, proclaims the uniqueness of the night and is integrally connected with Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. If Kiddush was not part of the Mitzvas Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, then according to Tosfos we would not have 4 cups associated with the Haggadah and Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim as required by the Takannah Chachamim for this night.

3. Explanation of Mah Nishtana The different items on the Seder plate are intended to arouse the curiosity of the children by indicating the Korban Pesach (shank bone), Maror, Charoses and the Matzoh. These are the topics around which the 4 questions revolve. The Rambam mentions that at this point the second cup of wine is poured and here the child asks and then (the Rambam adds) the leader (Koray) recites the 4 questions (Mah Nishtana). What does the child ask at this point if not the 4 questions? If the child has asked these questions, why does the leader recite the 4 questions as well? Why is the term Mah Nishtana used in reference to the leader and not the son? At the Seder of Reb Chaim Brisker ZT"L the children would recite the 4 questions in reverse age order and then Reb Chaim would recite the 4 questions prior to Avadim Hayinu. Reb Chaim's opinion was that Maggid had to be recited in question and answer format. That is why we say "This Pesach (sacrifice) that we are partaking of, for what reason do we do so (Al Shum Moh)".

Based on this, the Rav offered the following new interpretation of the 4 questions. If the questions only related to the eating of Matzoh and Maror, the text of the questions should have simply been: Why do we eat Matzoh on this evening? Why do we eat Maror? Why do we introduce the questions with the Mah Nishtana framework? Apparently, Mah Nishtana is part of the Mitzvah of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, part of the obligation to single out the night of Pesach, just like Kiddush. Again the comparison to Shabbos is important: Shabbos is unique in the prohibition of engaging in work. Pesach is unique in the 3 Mitzvos that apply only on this night, Pesach, Matzoh and Maror and Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. These 3 Mitzvos taken together with the questions regarding dipping the vegetables in salt water and the obligation to eat in a reclining position (that will be answered through Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim) represent the distinguishing characteristics of this night that are discussed as part of Maggid and Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. We introduce the questions with the unique structure of Mah Nishtana in order to underscore this uniqueness.

4. Explanation of Haggadah as Limud Torah The Rambam says (Hilchos Chametz Umatzoh 7:1) that one is obligated to retell the miracles and wonders God performed for our ancestors on the night of the fifteenth. Later (7:4) the Rambam says that we must begin with the stories of the humble situation (Genus) of the people and to conclude with the recitation of praise (Shevach). We must expound on (Doresh) the entire section of Arami Oved Avi. Later (7:5) the Rambam says that whoever does not recite Pesach, Matzoh and Maror on this night has not fulfilled his obligation. The Rambam then continues with the rest of the stories of the evening and says that these things are called Haggadah. Why does the Rambam introduce the term Haggadah to describe this complete process? Why not simply say that these segments, in total, comprise the Mitzvah of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim? [The Rav noted that the Gemara that introduced the term Haggadah, so the same question applies to the Gemara].

The Mishna in Pesachim notes that Arami Oved Avi is the central part of the Haggadah. One must expound on this entire section of the Torah and he who expends more effort to explain it is more highly praised. What is so special about this Parsha? Why didn't Chazal choose to examine the sections from Sefer Shemos that discuss the actual exodus itself? Apparently, Chazal felt that the theme of the Parsha of Arami Oved Avi is an expression of thanks to Hashem for taking us out of Egypt. We choose that Parsha over those in Shemos because in that passage it says that we must proclaim on this day, Higadti Hayom, praise and thanks to Hashem for taking us out of Egypt. Not only is recitation of this praise to Hashem, starting with the stimulus for descending to the depths of slavery in Egypt concluding with the exodus, appropriate on the day that one brings the first fruit to Jerusalem, but it is just as appropriate on the night of Pesach.

Why do the Gemara and the Rambam use the terms Vdoresh (expound, interpret) and Maarich Bdrash (expounding at great length)? Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim can only be fulfilled through the learning of both Torah Shbichtav (Written Law) and Torah Shbeal Peh (Oral Law). Doresh refers to Torah Shbeal Peh, to underscore that it is insufficient to simply read the Parsha as written in the Torah without interpreting and expounding on it with the Oral Law. The Rambam says that the father is obligated to teach his son according to the capabilities of the child. It does not say that the father has to tell him the story according to the capabilities of the son, because the obligation on this night is to teach Torah, both written and oral, to the child. The Hagoas Maimoni, at

the end of Hilchos Chametz and Matzoh quotes the Tosefta that one is obligated to immerse himself (Laasok), whether he is with a group or alone, in the laws of Pesach on this night. The Tosefta quotes the story of Rabban Gamliel and the sages in the home of Bytis Ben Zinin that were involved in the laws of Pesach the entire night until the morning. This is very similar to the story in our Haggadah of the sages in Bnay Brak, with the exception that the Tosefta uses the term Oskin (occupied) Bhilchos Hapesach (laws of Pesach) while our Haggada says they were Mesaprim (retelling the stories of) Byetzias Mitzrayim the entire night. Both episodes with the Chachamim involved the learning of Torah Shbichtav in a framework of Torah Shbeal Peh. Both refer to the answer that we give to the wise son on this evening who asks "what are the laws that Hashem has commanded us"? He is interested in learning all of Torah as stated in Parshas Vaeschanan, and his questions are not limited to the laws of Korban Pesach. We teach him about everything that happened to us in a framework of Talmud Torah and answer him through both the written and oral law. According to the Vilna Gaon the Mitzvas Talmud Torah on this evening includes teaching the wise son all the Mitzvos and laws of Pesach, concluding with the last Mitzvah of Afikomen.

Both the wise and wicked sons ask "Mah"? The difference between them is in the interpretation of this one-word question. The wicked son asks "what for", why are you bothering with these Mitzvos. The wise son asks "what are they". We must teach each child according to his capability, Chanoch Lanaar Al Pi Darko. The wise son is capable of much more than the others. The Ramban says that the obligation is to teach him all the Mitzvos, beginning with the 10 Commandments [since the question of the wise son appears in Parshas Vaeschanan preceding the Asseres Hadibros] concluding with the rest of the Mitzvos of Pesach night. The obligation of Vhigadta Lbincha all year expresses itself in the obligation to teach him Torah. On the night of Pesach it is augmented to also include the Mitzvas Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim as part of the obligation to teach the wise son Hilchos Pesach.

5. Hashem as Redeemer The Rambam says (7:2) that the father must teach his child according to his capabilities. He explains to the minor or less capable child that we were once slaves, like so and so who is a slave, and Hashem rescued us on this night and set us free. The father is obligated to teach the wise son about all that transpired in Egypt and about all the wonderful miracles that Hashem performed through Moshe our teacher. The Rav asked why do we tell the wise child about Moshe and his role in the exodus, while we do not mention Moshe at all, or the miracles he performed, to the foolish child?

Apparently this Beraysa teaches us two things: 1) Yetzias Mitzrayim was accomplished solely by Hashem. 2) it is forbidden to mention the name of the messenger (Moshe) in Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. The Rav explained that for this reason we do not mention the name of Moshe at all in the Haggadah. [According to some editions, Moshe is mentioned once, but only parenthetically as part of a verse that is quoted in the Haggadah. The Rambam's Haggadah does not mention Moshe at all.] Moshe is not mentioned because on the night of Pesach it was Hashem Himself, and only Hashem, who took us out of bondage and set us free. We stress the notion of Lo Al Yeday Malach, Hashem did not use an intermediary to rescue us on the night of Pesach. Why is it forbidden to mention a human being, Moshe, when we talk about redemption?

The Rav quoted a Midrash on Shir Hashirim (3:1) Al Mishkavi Balaylos refers to the night of the Seder. I sought my true love, refers to Knesses Yisrael (the metaphysical congregation of Israel) looking for Moshe, who recognized the one person who suffered so much from them and for them while attempting to convince both the Jewish People and Paroh that the time of redemption had arrived. However on this night, in the Haggadah, we do not find him. Only Hashem is the recognized redeemer of Israel on this night. No human being can share the title. On Purim we mention human beings in connection with the event, Blessed is Esther and Mordechai, because Purim was an incomplete redemption, since Chazal say that we are still the slaves of Achashveirush. The ultimate redemption will come about only through Hashem without mention of the Moshiach, as it says Yomru Geulay Hashem Asher Gealam Miyad Tzar (those that were redeemed by Hashem, Who rescued them from the hand of their enemy).

When we tell the story of the exodus and the redemption, only Hashem is mentioned since there was no co-redeemer. However when we study Torah, we are obligated to mention the name of Moshe, the teacher of Israel, because Moshe has an important part in Torah, Zichru Toras Moshe Avdi (Hashem refers to the Torah as Moshe's Torah). When we study with the foolish child, we mention only the stories of the redemption itself, hence we mention only Hashem, the sole redeemer. However, when we study with the wise son, the entire Haggadah becomes an article of Torah Shbichtav and Torah Shbeal Peh, we therefore mention Moshe throughout.

The Rav explained that for this reason the Ramban refers to the entire set of stories and explanations as Haggadah and not Sippur. Haggadah means Drash, study of Torah. On this night we do not simply relate stories. Rather, we learn Torah Shbichtav through a framework of Torah Shbeal Peh. The Parshas Arami Oved Avi as well as the statement of Rabban Gamliel regarding Pesach, Matzoh and Maror are all part of Midrash and Limud Torah. We say Baruch Hamakom before we mention the 4 sons to show that up until this point we were engaged in story telling. From now on we are engaging in Limud Torah with the wise son. We recite Bircas Hatorah, Baruch Hamakom, before we study.

6. Duration of Mitzvas Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim The Haggadah says that Baavur Zeh teaches me that there is an obligation to study the Haggadah when (Pesach) Matzoh and Maror are placed before you. According to Rabbi Eliezer Ben Azaryah, does the obligation for Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim conclude at Chatzos (midnight), when the Mitzvas Pesach and Matzoh conclude, or is it the same as all other Mitzvos whose obligation begins at nightfall, and extends all night? Some Rishonim are of the opinion that indeed, the obligation for Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim extends throughout the night. According to Tosfos (Megilla 21a, a Diyuk in DH Laasuyei) and the Ran, the obligation of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim concludes at Chatzos. A strong proof to the opinion that Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim extends throughout the night is the story that we relate in our Haggadah of the great Rabbis that were assembled in Bnay Brak and were Mesaper (involved in the telling of the stories) Byetzias Mitzrayim the entire night. Rabbi Eliezer Ben Azaryah (according to many opinions, though not Tosfos) was among this group. Some Rishonim say that based on this episode in Bnay Brak, that Rabbi Eliezer's position is that Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim extends to the entire night.

The Mechilta says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer that a group of Talmidei Chachamim is obligated to discuss Hilchos Pesach [only] till Chatzos based on the verse Mah Haaydos Vhachukim etc. The Ritva (in a Haggadah published in Warsaw in 1878) says that according to Rabbi Eliezer the obligation for Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim concludes at Chatzos. However the Ritva mentions that our Haggadah, which mentions that Rabbi Eliezer participated with the other great scholars all evening, appears to contradict this. The Rav explained that there are 2 different

kinds of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. The first is the Midrashim of Arami Oved Avi and relating the miracles that occurred in Egypt on our behalf. The other Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim is through the answer we give the wise child as part of teaching him the laws of Pesach. According to Rabbi Eliezer, Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim that relates to expounding the Parshas Arami Oved Avi, is no different than all other Mitzvos that are performed at night and may therefore be extended throughout the night. The Drasha of Bshaah Sheyesh Matzoh Umaror Munachim Lfanecha (you shall expound on the exodus at the time that Matzoh and Maror are placed before you) excludes Erev Pesach. Since the obligation for Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim begins at nightfall, it is no different than other Mitzvos that are performed at night, and may continue throughout the night. However teaching the laws of Pesach, the laws that are specific to this night of Korban Pesach and Matzoh, extends only during the period that the Pesach itself may be eaten, and according to Rabbi Eliezer concludes with Chatzos.

Therefore our Haggadah that includes Rabbi Eliezer Ben Azaryah in the group that were Mesaprim Byetzias Mitzrayim Kol Halayla (all night) is referring to the stories and Drasha of Arami Oved Avi. Rabbi Eliezer agrees that this type of Sippur can continue all night. However the Mechilta that quotes Rabbi Eliezer as restricting the discussion of Hilchos Hapesach to Chatzos [the same period that the Korban Pesach may be eaten] is referring to the second type of Sippur, that of studying the laws. The study of the laws of Korban Pesach one minute after Chatzos, according to Rabbi Eliezer, no longer retains this second aspect of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. It is no different than studying any portion of Torah, for example the laws of Yibum and Chalitzah.

7. The Obligation of the Jew to Relive History One is obligated to view himself as if he himself had left Egypt. When a Jew fulfills Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim he must do it as if he were giving eye witness testimony to an event, Haggadas Aydus, where personal experience is the root of his belief in his testimony and what spurs him to come to Beis Din to testify. There is a principle in Hilchos Aydus that a person who has second hand knowledge of a situation, Ayd Mpi Ayd, is not accepted as a witness. When the father teaches his child about Yetzias Mitzrayim, he must do it as a witness testifying to what he himself experienced. He must breathe life into the events and make them come alive for the child so that he feels the excitement of the exodus. He must not portray the stories as events that happened thousands of years ago, events that have no connection to us today. This is why the we call it Haggadah, for it is similar to Haggadas Aydus, in that we give testimony this night to the events that affect us today as much as when they occurred years ago. In fact, this characteristic of Haggadas Aydus, of reliving the past and identifying with events that occurred years ago, as if they were occurring now for the first time, is a uniquely Jewish characteristic. The Rav bemoaned the way that Chumash is taught in American Yeshivos. Students do not relive the events of the past. They do not accompany Avraham and Isaac on their trip to Mount Moriah, they do not feel the moment when Avraham is prepared to sacrifice his son on the altar. The students are not taught to feel a special closeness to the patriarchs. The Rav said that the educators are at fault for not inspiring their students.

The statement Bchal Dor Vador, that in every generation the Jew must view himself as a participant in the event, applies to many situations besides Pesach. For example, Tisha Bav eve, we eat the Seudah Hamafsekes where meat and wine are forbidden. Chazal required the Jew to act as an Onen, someone who is preoccupied with the burial of a loved one. Chazal restricted what we may do on Tisha Bav because the Jew must feel the reality of the Churban and the grief that it has brought the Jewish nation. The sense of loss is so great that we do not put on Tefillin until the afternoon. No other nation relives its history or its grief in such a personal way to the point of accepting responsibility for it, as Chazal say any generation that does not rebuild the Beis Hamikdash is guilty of its destruction. When Tisha Bav comes and the Beis Hamikdash has not yet been rebuilt we see again the Holy of Holies in flames and we feel once more the anguish of those that were massacred. And we assume guilt for causing the tragedy.

Another example the Rav mentioned is that on Shavuos we read the story of receiving the Torah at Mount Sinai with the Taam Elyon (upper cantillation notes). Taam Elyon delineates units while Taam Tachtan separates verses. On Shavuos we reenact the Kabbalas Hatorah, as if we were receiving the 10 Commandments from Hashem right now. We bear witness, as participants in the singular event that bound us to Hashem forever and has shaped and defined our destiny of sadness and greatness throughout the generations. All of Jewish History must be relived by us in a way that qualifies us to provide Haggadas Aydus and not simply to tell a story. [The Rav said that teachers today tell stories to their students. They do not give testimony to their students. He credited his first teacher for instilling in him such strong feelings and emotions to Torah that made him feel like an eye witness to the events that he studied about.]

Haggadas Aydus for the Jew is bound up with the concept of Midas Hachessed, attribute of kindness. There are 3 concepts of righteousness. Mishpat is justice according to the letter of the law. Tzedakkah and Chesed go beyond the letter of the law, the Baal Chesed (performer or master of kindness) acts the same way that a Baal Tzedakah (charity) does. The difference between them lies in the motivation that drives them to act. The Baal Chesed is called a Nediv Lev while the Baal Tzedakkah is called Nesao Rucho. The latter helps people because it appeals to him intellectually to help. Even a miser can teach himself to be generous when he sees someone in dire need. The intellect understands that if he has been given great wealth he has an obligation to help others that are less fortunate. The Nediv Lev gives charity because he empathizes with the one in need, he feels his pain and anguish as if it were his own. He can't sleep at night knowing that another person is in distress.

The Midrash Eichah comments on the verse Bacho Sivkeh Balayla, that the cries of a person travel farther at night when there is less sound interference than during the day. The Gemara in Sanhedrin relates the story of a widow who lived in the neighborhood of Rabban Gamliel who would cry all night for her son who was killed in the Churban. Rabban Gamliel heard her cries and would weep together with her, to the point that he caused his eyelashes to fall out. What was so special about Rabban Gamliel's actions? Presumably others heard her cries as well and felt sympathy for her? While others may have heard her cries and wept with her for one night, for a week, or perhaps even a month, their intellect told them that the time had come for them to move on and to shut out her cries. These people were Nesao Rucho. However Rabban Gamliel continued to cry along with her, he could not console himself if the widow was still bereft with grief. He was a Nediv Lev. A Nediv Lev like Rabban Gamliel is capable of reliving the grief of the Churban on Tisha Bav as if it just happened. He is also able to relive the ecstasy of the exodus from Egypt on the night of Pesach as if he himself was a leaving Egypt at that minute.

In summary, the Jew must be capable of suspending his intellect and to sometimes view the world through the eyes and emotions of a child. An adult tells a story without showing any attachment or emotion. A child relives every part of a story no matter how many times he may have

told the story. He trembles with the fear and exults in the joy of the event, each time as if the event was happening to him at that moment. The Rav said that this was the greatness of Gedolei Yisrael. Reb Chaim Brisker was a genius in Torah as well as, and perhaps an even greater genius, in charity and kindness. Despite the great scholarship of Reb Chaim and his amazing ability to think abstractly and classify and refine concepts and ideas, he still retained the dedication and zeal of a child as seen through his strong faith in Hashem. Reb Chaim told his son that a Rabbi must be a Baal Tzedakkah and a Baal Chesed. He must be capable of constant empathy for those in need. He must also be able to suspend his intellectual approach to the world and relive Jewish life and Jewish history through the eyes of a child, as a witness who participated in a great event.

From:mj-ravtorah@shamash.org koraych.98 Shiur HaRav Soloveichik ZT"L on the Topic of Koraych (Shiur date: 4/2/72)

The Rav analyzed the institution of Koraych, elucidating the opinions of Rashbam, Tosafos and the Rambam.

The Gemara (Pesachim 115a) states: "Ravina said Rav Mesharshiya the son of Rav Nassan told me: Thus said Hillel in the name of the Gemara: A person should not wrap Matzo and Maror together and eat them because Matzo nowadays is a biblical obligation and Maror is only a Rabbinic one, and so the Maror (which is only a Rabbinic obligation) will nullify the Matzo (which is a Biblical obligation). And even according to the one who says that Mitzvos do not nullify one another, his opinion was said with regards to one Biblical Mitzvah nullifying another Biblical Mitzvah, or to a Rabbinic Mitzvah nullifying another Rabbinic Mitzvah. However, in the case of a Biblical Mitzvah and a Rabbinic Mitzvah, even he agrees that the Rabbinic Mitzvah nullifies the Biblical mitzvah". "Who is the Tana that said that Mitzvos do not nullify one another? It is Hillel, for it was taught in a Baraisa: they said about Hillel, that he would wrap them together and eat them as a sandwich, as it is stated in the Torah, Al Matzos Umrorim Yochlulu, with Matzos and bitter herbs they shall eat it". "Rabbi Yochanan said: Hillel's colleagues disagree with him, for it was taught in another Braisa: One might have thought that one should wrap them together and eat them in the manner that Hillel ate them. The Torah therefore states: with matzos and bitter herbs they shall eat it. Even (Afilu) each (Pesach, Matzo and Maror) individually". "Rav Ashi asks, if so, why does the Braisa state "Afilu"? Rather, Rav Ashi said, this Tana is teaching thus: you might have thought that one cannot fulfill his obligation unless he wraps them together and eats them in the manner that Hillel ate them. The Torah therefore states "with Matzos and Maror they shall eat it", Afilu (even) this by itself and that by itself". "Now that the Halacha has not been stated neither in accordance with Hillel nor in accordance with the Rabbis, one should first recite the blessing on the Matzo and eat it by itself and then recite the blessing on the Maror and eat it by itself, and afterward eat Matzo and Maror together without a blessing as commemoration of the way Hillel fulfilled the Mitzvah when the Temple stood."

The Rav analyzed the above Talmudic discussion according to the opinions of Rashi (and the Rashbam), Tosafos and the Rambam. According to Rashi and the Rashbam, the Hillel sandwich consisted of Pesach, Matzo and Maror. According to Hillel, Mitzvos don't cancel each other if they are equivalent. Therefore the above sandwich can be eaten as one Maaseh Achila (act of eating) when all the components are equivalent in terms of biblical obligation. However since Maror is only a Rabbinic obligation nowadays, it can't be eaten together with the Matzo that is a Torah obligation. Rabbi Yochanan says that Hillel's colleagues disagree, which seems to indicate that Pesach, Matzo and Maror must each be eaten separately and Rabbi Yochanan brings a Braisa to support his opinion. This Braisa uses the word "Afilu" (even). Rav Ashi then says, you, Rabbi Yochanan are correct, the rabbis insist that each must be eaten separately, however the Braisa you quote does not support this; rather it supports the opinion that one has the choice to eat them together or separately.

There are three opinions. According to Hillel, Koraych is mandated, according to the Rabbis one should not make Koraych and according to the Braisa brought by Rabbi Yochanan (as interpreted by Rav Ashi) one has a choice. According to this approach even in the time of the Temple the Jews ate Pesach, Matzo and Maror separately and then together to fulfill the Mitzvah according to both the Rabbis and Hillel. Today we perform these Mitzvos exactly the same way as was done when the Temple stood, Zecher L'Mikdash, as the Halachah was in doubt even when the Temple stood, since perhaps the law was according to Hillel's opinion. Tosafos opinion is that the Hillel sandwich consisted of Pesach, Matzo and Maror eaten in one Maaseh Achilah. Rabbi Yochanan agreed with the Braisa that Koraych is optional. The students thought that Koraych was not acceptable. Rav Ashi says to them that the Braisa says Afilu, Koraych is optional and you students are mistaken. According to Tosafos, there are only two opinions: Hillel requires Koraych while according to the Rabbis Koraych is optional. So when the Temple stood they made Koraych as all agreed this is good (required according to Hillel, optional according to the Rabbis). After the Temple was destroyed, the problem of Maror D'Rabanan canceling the Matzo D'Oreisa (today all agree that Maror is D'Rabanan) arose. According to Hillel, we could do the following: first eat Matzo to fulfill the Torah obligation. All that remains, according to Hillel, is the Rabbinic obligation to eat Matzo and Maror together Zecher L'Mikdash. However, according to the Rabbis who do not require Koraych, once the Matzo is eaten there is no longer an obligation to eat Matzo, any Matzo that would now be eaten together with Maror would be a Reshus (voluntary). The Matzo D'Reshus would be Mvatel (nullify) the Maror which is a higher priority obligation as it is a Mitzva D'Rabanan. We therefore first eat Matzo then Maror separately to fulfill their respective levels of obligation. Afterwards, since both are now Reshus, we combine them Zecher L'Mikdash the way Hillel did when the Temple stood. The Rambam (H ilchos Chametz UMatzo 8:6) outlines the Seder service in Temple times. The sandwich consisted only of Matzo and Maror. Also, according to the Ra mbam, this Matzo and Maror Koraych was optional. The Rambam renders the Halacha like the Rabbis, against Hillel. In Halacha 8 he outlines the Seder in post Temple times and writes that first one eats Matzo followed by Maror and then he is Koraych Matzo and Maror eating them without a blessing "Zecher L'Mikdash". If the Rambam's opinion is that there is no requirement for Koraych in temple times, why do we do it at all nowadays? Also, why does he omit Hillel from the Zecher L'Mikdash formula? The Rav explained the Rambam: there are two separate Mitzvos on the seder night. The first is to eat Matzo on the night of Pesach, as it says Baerev Tochlu Matzo. The second Mitzvah is to eat the Korban Pesach with Matzo and Maror. This is based on the verse "Al Matzos Umrorim Yochlulu". Note that this verse, quoted by Hillel, is

from Pesach Shaini (Bamidbar 9,11 not Shmos 12-8). From the verse in Shmos, we might have thought that the e Torah was just telling us that Baerev Tochlu Matzos applies on the night when we also eat the Korban Pesach. However on Pesach Shaini, where the verse Baerev Tochlu Matzos is not written, there is no obligation to eat Matzo at night. Hence the verse in Bamidbar (according to Hillel) is telling us that there is a Kiyum of eating all three items together that explains the gist of the verse in Shmos 12-8. The Rabbis do not disagree with Hillel that there are two distinct Kiyumim (fulfillment) (of Baerev Tochlu Matzo and Al Matzos Umrorim Yochlulu). They only disagree with Hillel when he says the Matzo and Maror have to be eaten in a single Maaseh Achila (act of eating) in order to achieve the additional Kiyum of Al Matzo Umrorim Yochlulu. The Rabbis are of the opinion that they can be eaten separately, as the requirement is the consumption of the Korban Pesach at the same meal together with the Matzo and Maror . Ho wever nowadays, when we have no Korban Pesach, the Rabbis instituted a Mitzva D'Rabanan of Al Matzos Umrorim as a remembrance of Temple times, Zecher L'Mikdash, when we had the Korban Pesach and could accomplish both Mitzvos, albeit separately. Since we have no Korban to focus all the elements into the Kiyumim of Al Matzos Umrorim, Chazal instituted Koraych as a conspicuous demonstration Zecher Lmikdash to remind me that things were different when the Temple stood.

Therefore, according to the Rambam who agrees with the Rabbis against Hillel, there was no Mitzvah of Koraych when the Temple stood, so the Rambam did not mention it when he discusses the Seder in the time of the Temple. He simply mentions that they would either eat Matzo and Maror separately or they might combine them, but in neither case were they eaten together with the Korban Pesach. However, when he discusses the Seder nowadays, he does mention the obligation of Koraych, because the Rabbis, and not Hillel, instituted this in order that there should be some form of Zecher Lmikdash as part of our Seder. Since this opinion of the Rabbis applies only when there is no Temple, and it is not based on a practice that took place when the Temple stood (since they disagreed with Hillel), the Rambam says that we do this Zecher Lmikdash but he omits K'Hillel, since this practice is not the same as Hillel's. [Note: the Gemara (Pesachim 115a) says that since the Halacha was not clarified we do both and the Gemara mentions that we do Koraych Zecher Lmikdash Khillel.]

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Laws of Pesach which Falls on Shabbat by Rav Yosef Zvi Rimon
Translated by Rav Eliezer Kwass ... 1. EATING MATZA ON SHABBAT

When Rosh Ha-shana falls out on Shabbat, we do not blow the shofar (Rosh Ha-shana 29b); on Shabbat Sukkot we do not take the lulav and etrog (Sukka 42b); and we do not read Megillat Esther on Purim that falls out on Shabbat (Megilla 4b). Rav Yosef Shaul Natanson zt"l (Sho'el U-meishiv, 4th ed., 1:5) was asked why the same should not apply to matza. Why is Pesach different than these other nights? Rabba in the gemara explains that the reason behind these decrees is, "Lest he take it (the lulav, megilla, or shofar) in his hand to an expert [and thereby transgress the prohibition against hotza'a: transferring an object on Shabbat from the private to the public domain] to learn how to use it" (Sukka 42b). At first glance the problem does not arise - what expertise is required in eating a piece of matza? However, Rashi explains, "To Learn: how to shake it (the lulav) or RECITE ITS BLESSING." The same problem should apply to Pesach - we should be worried about someone taking his matza to a rabbi in order to learn its laws and thereby transgressing the laws of Shabbat!

A number of answers are offered by the Acharonim: A. THE NETZIV (Ha'amek She'eila, Vayakhel, She'ilta DePurim, section 21) answers simply that we are not worried about someone leaving his house at night. The other mitzvot mentioned above apply during the day, when people normally leave their homes. (The main mitzva of megilla is during the day.) B. HARAV ZVI PESACH FRANK (Mikra'ei Kodesh, Pesach Part 2, 13:2) quotes Rabbi Yitzchak Yerucham Diskin's answer. The quantity of matza required is the size of an olive, whereas the minimum for transgressing the biblical prohibition of carrying is larger, the size of a date or a fig (see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbat 18:1). Therefore no rabbinic decree was enacted, since there was no danger of transgressing hotza'a on a biblical level. Rav Frank himself rejects this answer. The quantities relevant for transgressing the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat are not fixed, but subjectively based on SIGNIFICANCE. True, in general the quantity of food that would obligate one for carrying on Shabbat is the size of a date or fig. If, though, one would have a good reason to consider a smaller quantity as significant, one would also transgress by carrying that smaller quantity. Thus we see (Shabbat 76b) that if one carries the amount of wine

concentrate it takes to produce a revit (i.e. the amount for kiddush), he thereby violates the prohibition of carrying. Likewise, on Pesach night a ke-zayit would be considered significant enough to transgress the prohibition against carrying. C. We could just simply say that there are not many halakhot one needs to know about matza once it is made. The production of matza requires expertise, but eating it does not. The lulav, megilla, and shofar require expertise in the performance of the mitzva. D. Another simple way of resolving this problem: Granted, there are enough relevant halakhot that might lead one to go to a rav for instruction on the Seder night. Still, one would not have to take the matza with him! To know how to blow shofar, shake a lulav, or read a megilla one would need to take the object; here there is no such need.

BERIT MILA AND SHOFAR This question arises in two other areas. The Ritva (Sukka 42a) asks why one is able to perform a circumcision on Shabbat - why aren't we afraid that one will carry the knife? The Minchat Chinukh (mitzva 9) asks why we are able to blow shofar on a normal Rosh Ha-shana - shouldn't it be included under the rabbinic decree prohibiting playing musical instruments on Shabbat and holidays? Each of these questions is given a local answer. The Ritva answers that since the berit mila procedure itself involves transgressing Shabbat (and yet the Torah still commands us to perform it on the eighth day, even if it is Shabbat), the rabbis did not enact a prohibition due to the possibility of Shabbat being transgressed in another way. The Minchat Chinukh answers the second question: why do we not prohibit blowing the shofar under the category of playing musical instruments on holidays. The sages, he says, would not make a decree that would TOTALLY ANNUL a mitzva. The concern about carrying a shofar applies only when Rosh Ha-shana falls on Shabbat, but this problem comes up every year.

My father-in-law, Rav Eliyahu Blumenzweig, suggested a way of resolving both of these problems, the Ritva's and the Minchat Chinukh's, at once. He notes that the decree against taking the lulav, blowing the shofar, and reading the megilla on Shabbat only applies when a holiday falls on Shabbat. Yom Tov is much more active than Shabbat and there is a danger that, with all the excitement, the Shabbat side of the day with its extra prohibitions, including carrying, will be forgotten. However, this fear applies only to Yom Tov (which falls on Shabbat); the Halakha does not have a general concern that someone will forget the holiness of Shabbat and desecrate it in order to perform another mitzva. Transgressing a normal Shabbat in order to carry a mila knife was never a worry (the Ritva's question); neither was transgressing a normal Yom Tov through blowing a shofar (the Minchat Chinukh's question). The decree was based on a concern that people would forget the Shabbat aspect of a Yom Tov which falls on Shabbat. In our case, Pesach falling on Shabbat, we are forced to rely on one of the answers listed above in order to understand why the sages did not decree against eating matza on Shabbat. [For a detailed discussion of this issue, see responsa Chazon Ovadia (part 1, vol. 2, section 31).]

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innernet@jer1.co.il] Wednesday, April 01, 1998 INNERNET MAGAZINE - THE SEASON OF RENEWAL based on lecture by Rabbi Gedalya Schorr prepared for publication by Rabbi Avrohom Schorr Reprinted with permission from The Jewish Observer, March 1982, Agudath Israel of America, New York.

Liberation and Rejuvenation Prior to the Jews' exodus from Egypt, they were entrusted with three precepts, the first of which was the establishment of the lunar calendar. This commandment signified the beginning of their redemption from the yoke of slavery (1). When a person is enslaved, his time belongs to no-one but his master, for a slave is obligated to utilize all of his time in productive activity for the benefit of his master, leaving him no time whatsoever to spend as he pleases. Once the Jews were about to be redeemed, they were told: "This month is for you . . ." The utilization of time is now in your hands. You are in charge of how to

employ it. This precept is more than just a transitional link between slavery and freedom (2). It teaches the very essence of freedom. This is indicated by a description of the onset of this exile, when the Torah states that "a new king arose over Egypt . . ." (Exodus 1:5). The rabbis of the Talmud explain that in reality the same king still ruled; however, his ways were different in that he no longer recognized the contributions of his viceroy--"that did not know Joseph" (ibid) . . . The king renewed himself--that is, he changed his personality, and ushered in a new regime.

The capability of renewing oneself is a special strength that is not come by easily; at the same time, however, it is a trait that is essential to every G-d fearing man. "Rosh Chodesh" (3), the new month, begins with the appearance of the new moon, the natural symbol of rejuvenation. Just as the moon goes through its phases of waning and waxing, renewing itself at the onset of each new month, so too can a person renew himself spiritually. This is stated clearly in the prayers recited at the appearance of the new moon. "The Jewish nation is destined to renew itself just as the moon does." Therefore, they were told: "This month is for you." The attribute of renewal was now theirs, when on the threshold of their redemption. In fact, this very quality was their gateway to freedom.

The Sign of the Gift The disciples of Rabbeinu Yonah (4) question the importance attributed to "Rosh Chodesh": Isn't it merely a question of a mathematical computation as to when the new moon will appear? Why, then, should the natural phenomenon of the reappearance of the moon symbolize the virtue of being able to rejuvenate oneself? In reply, Rabbeinu Yonah cites the passage in the Talmud that states that when one gives a morsel of food to a child, one should notify his mother. This dictum is clarified by advising that if one smears oil on the child's face, it is tantamount to notifying the mother. When the mother later sees the smear on the child's face, she will realize that he had met someone. Upon questioning the child, she will learn that he had been given some food (Shabbos 10b).

In the same vein, when G-d bestows upon us an influential force in abundance, He wants us to be aware of the opportunity it entails. A "smear on the face" of events in the earthly world symbolizes a corresponding event of a similar sort in spiritual spheres. True, the renewal of the moon is a "natural" occurrence, but it simultaneously serves as a reminder to all who see it of an abundance of a particular spiritual influence from Above--namely, one's spiritual rejuvenation. We attest to "Rosh Chodesh" as the beginning of redemption in a passage that we recite at the Seder. The Haggadah proposes that the recital of the Haggadah begin from the first of the month rather than from the actual day of the Exodus. "Rosh Chodesh" comes into consideration, for the actual redemption did commence on "Rosh Chodesh"--a day that possesses that powers of rejuvenation that led to the redemption. The decision, however, is that full praise to G-d is only recited at the conclusion of the redemption, which is Seder night.

The Earthly Links All the holidays are associated with a material phenomenon as the reason for rejoicing. Passover is celebrated as the holiday of "Aviv"--springtime, a time when trees blossom and grains sprout; . . . Shavuoth is "Katzir", summer--the season in which we reap grain; and Succoth is called "Chag HaAsif"--the Autumn Festival, when the wheat is harvested. Since there are obvious spiritual reasons for rejoicing, why are these holidays connected with earthly events? This linking of these holidays to occurrences in the natural world serves as a symbol of spiritual influence of a similar kind. The blossoming reminds us of the spiritual influence that aids us in returning to our youthful vigor, enabling us to start anew. Thus Passover, when we gained our freedom from slavery, is directly related to this season. Freedom from slavery encompasses not only the right to use time as one pleases, but also signifies the rise of a new spirit within each person, experiencing a renewed belief in G-d.

The Recurring Time of Renewal As has been said many times, a Jewish holiday is not merely a commemorative event. Just as the age-old cycle of nature repeats itself every year, at the same time, with the same force, so too does the spiritual cycle assert itself again with all its original characteristics, year after year. That same influence of rejuvenation

bestowed upon us on the first day of Nissan in Egypt, returns every year on that day. On Passover we are aided in our ability to free ourselves from whatever "masters" we may have become enslaved to. It is only by utilizing this bounty of spiritual influence at the time of the holidays, that a person can live up to its true meaning. And on Passover itself, one is especially aided in one's ability to free oneself from any self-imposed yoke of slavery. One need not despair from the burden of wayward tendencies of the past. One can now start anew! One can go in the ways of our forefathers who seized this opportune time to be redeemed from the depths of impurity. Thus Passover more than teaches us a lesson of rejuvenation and rededication. It is a season when we can experience rejuvenation and rededication with a freshness rivaling that of the original Passover, because in some respects, it is the original Passover.

NOTES: (1) Sipurno (2) The Chidushei HaRim - Rabbi Yitzchok Meir Alter, the first Gerer Rebbe (3) Rosh Chodesh is the beginning of each Jewish lunar month. Rosh Chodesh is one or two days depending on the preceding month. If the preceding month was thirty days, then Rosh Chodesh is the last day of the previous month and the first day of the current month, if it was only twenty nine days, then Rosh Chodesh is just one day. (4) Sage of Gerundi, Spain (circa 1220-1280)

tsc-par-new@virtual.co.il] Friday, April 03, 1998 MAGID - shiur for shabbos ha'gadol MAZEL TO SAM & OFI MICHELSON on the birth of their son Yonatan, whose bris was this morning here in Alon Shevut! THE TANACH STUDY CENTER [http://www.virtual.co.il/torah/tanach] In Memory of Rabbi Abraham Leibtag

MAGID - Telling the story of Yetziat Mitzraim

What is the most important part of MAGID? We are all familiar with the 4 questions, the 4 sons and the many songs etc., but when during MAGID do we actually tell over the story of Yetziat Mitzraim (the Exodus)? To answer this question, and to better appreciate the Haggada, this week's shiur analyzes the flow and structure of MAGID.

INTRODUCTION Our primary obligation on the seder night is to tell over the story of the Exodus [SIPUR Yetziat Mitzraim]. In contrast to our daily 'passive' obligation to 'remember' the Exodus [ZECHER Yetziat Mitzraim / which we fulfill in daily kriyat shma by reading Bamidbar 15:41], on the evening of the 15th of Nisan we are obligated to 'actively' tell that story. [This obligation is based on the pasuk in Parshat Bo: "v'HIGADTA - And you must TELL your son on that day, saying: BA'AVUR ZEH..." (Shmot 13:8). The precise meaning of this pasuk will be discussed later in the further iyun section.] With this background, let's take a closer look at MAGID in order to determine WHEN and WHERE we actually fulfill this mitzvah.

OPENING REMARKS The opening paragraph of MAGID - "ha lachma anyana..." is definitely not the story of Yetziat Mitzraim, but rather a quick explanation about the MATZA on the table, and serves as an open invitation for others to participate ["kol dichfin..."]. [On the meaning of "lechem oni", iy'h in a later shiur.] The famous "mah nishtana" which follows is again not part of the story, but rather ensures that the children will take interest in the story which we are about to tell. Obviously, the children asking first enhances our fulfillment of "v'higadta l'VINCHA" (see Shmot 13:8) as well as similar psukim relating to "when your children will ask..." (see Shmot 12:26, 13:14 and Devarim 12:20). However, as you have surely noticed, we don't answer the "mah nishtana" right away. "Avadim hayinu..." may at first sound like the beginning of a story, but when we continue this paragraph, we don't find a story. Let's explain why.

DEFINITIONS FIRST In "avadim hayinu..." we make two very important statements: 1) Had God not saved us, we'd still be slaves today; 2) Even those who 'know it all' are still obligated to tell the story. In other words, BEFORE we tell the story, we first DEFINE our obligation! Therefore, first we explain: * WHY we are obligated - even though several thousands of years have passed; and then * WHO is obligated - i.e. everyone - even those who already know the entire story. The first statement deals with the most fundamental underlying question of the Haggada - What obligates all future generations to thank God for a redemption which took place for only one specific generation. As we shall see, this point will resurface several times in the Haggada. Our second statement relates to another important consideration. One could think that our obligation is simply to KNOW the story of the Exodus, and hence our obligation is only to inform those who do not yet know the story, or may have forgotten it. Here, the Haggada tells us that our obligation is to TELL the story, over and over again, even though we may already know all of its details. The next section of MAGID - beginning with "baruch ha'Makom", discusses the FOUR SONS. Here, once again, we do not find the actual story of Yetziat Mitzraim, but rather yet another aspect of our obligation, i.e. HOW we are to tell the story. As we shall explain in one of the 'mini-shiurim' which follow, the basic message of this section is that we must be 'dynamic' teachers as we tell over the story, and adapt it to the level of our audience. This section ends with one final paragraph: "yachol m'rosh chodeh..." which explain WHEN we are obligated to tell the story, i.e. on the night of the 15th of Nisan, and not any earlier or later. Finally, after defining the various aspects of our obligation, we begin the story of Yetziat Mitzraim with "m'tchila ovday avodah zarah..."

WHERE DOES THE STORY BEGIN? At this point in MAGID, we are finally ready to begin to tell our story. However, we now encounter a new problem - from WHERE does the story of Yetziat Mitzraim actually begin? Technically speaking, we could start with the story of creation of mankind. More practically speaking, we should start with the story of our enslavement in Egypt. So where should we start? From: 1) Moshe & the burning bush; 2) Pharaoh's decree to enslave the Jews; 3) Yaakov's descent to Egypt with 70 "nefesh"; 4) the brothers selling Yosef? For some reason, the Haggada answers 'none of above'. Instead, it chooses to begin with God's choice of the Avot, by quoting Yehoshua's speech at Shechem: "m'tchila ovdei avoda zara hayu avoteinu... - Our forefathers were once idol worshippers... but God chose Avraham, Yitzchak... and Yaakov and his children went down to Egypt." (see Yehoshua 24:1-5, note where the quote ends!) In a nutshell, these three psukim constitute a summary of the primary theme of Sefer Breishit, i.e. God's choice of Avot to

become His special nation. But why does the story of Yetziat Mitzraim begin here? The answer is simple, but fundamental. When God chose Avraham Avinu, He established a COVENANT in which He promised a special Land for Avraham's offspring. However, that covenant - "brit bein ha'bram" - included an important clause that before they would inherit that land, Bnei Yisrael would become enslaved in a foreign land from which God would later redeem them. [See Breishit 15:1-18, especially 15:13-15!] Therefore, the full story of Yetziat Mitzraim really begins with "brit bein ha'bram", and hence God's choice of the Avot. This explains not only why we begin with "m'tchila..." but also why the next paragraph is: "Baruch shomer havtachato... - Blessed is He who keeps His promise to Am Yisrael... as God had promised Avraham Avinu at "brit bein ha'bram": "Know that your offspring will be strangers in a foreign land which will oppress and enslave them for four hundred years..." But even more so, this explains why we are obligated to remember Yetziat Mitzraim in every generation! Recall that "brit bein ha'bram" is not merely a promise of one event, but rather it defines an eternal relationship between God and His people. Therefore, the story of Yetziat Mitzraim is only the initial stage of an everlasting relationship, for which we must thank God for every year on "leil ha'seder". This connection between that event and all future generations neatly explains the next paragraph in MAGID: "v'HI sh'amda l'avoteinu... - And it is THIS [COVENANT, i.e. brit bein ha'bram]" which stood for our fathers, AND for us as well, for not only once were we in danger of destruction, but in EVERY generation... and Hashem saves us [in every generation] from our enemies." Now, with this 'prophetic background', we are finally ready to tell the story itself. However, again to our surprise, we do not tell the story in a straightforward manner, but rather by quoting a elaborate Midrash on the pasuk of "arami oved avi" [from "mikra bikurim" - see Devarim 26:1-10], i.e. the section in MAGID of "tzey u'lmad: mah bikesh Lavan..." [When you read these psukim, note their thematic and textual connection to "brit bein ha'bram" - 'vakmal'] Look at this section of MAGID very carefully, noting how we take these four psukim from Devarim 26:5-8, 'disect' them, and then bring a proof for every phrase (usually from the story of the Exodus in Sefer Shmot or a pasuk in Tehillim). Thus, the Haggada uses the psukim of "arami oved avi" as the 'frame' for telling over the story of Yetziat Mitzraim. Note how the Midrash of this pasuk takes us all the way until the story of the MAKKOT [the Ten Plagues] and the splitting of the Red Sea, and thus completes the entire story. [This point is extremely important, for if our "drasha" of "arami oved avi" is the actual SIPUR of Yetziat Mitzraim - then this would be the most important section of the Haggada! From my experience this is usually one of the most neglected parts of the Haggadah, since this is usually when most of us are either hiding the afikomen, measuring their kzayis of matzah, reading chidushim (or snooping around the kitchen checking our what's for "shulchan aruch"). Therefore, it's important that we not only pay attention to this section, but also use it to tell over the details of the story to those who don't understand these psukim.]

The song of DAYENU which follows this Midrash serves as both a poetic summary of this story and a form of HALLEL (praise). [See separate 'mini-shiur' on this topic / sent out last year and available on TSC WEB Site.]

RABAN GAMLIEL & HALLEL Before we complete our story, we want to make sure that we also fulfill Raban Gamliel's opinion that while we tell the story of Yetziat Mitzraim, we must be sure to mention the reasons for PESACH, MATZA & MAROR as well. Therefore, this section forms the conclusion of our SIPUR Yetziat Mitzraim, and we are now ready to say Hallel - to praise God for our salvation. However, before we say HALLEL, we must qualify our praise. Again, we return to our underlying theme that every generation is obligated to thank God for Yetziat Mitzraim. Therefore, we conclude by stating that in every generation each individual must feel as though HE himself was redeemed from Egypt. Once we understand integral connection between the events of Yetziat Mitzraim and 'brit Avot', i.e. our purpose as God's special Nation, this statement of: "bchor dor v'dor chayav adam lirot atzmo k'yulu hu yatza m'mitzraim..." takes on additional significance. MAGID ends with the first two chapters of HALLEL, followed by the 2nd cup and the bracha of "geula" [redemption].

A SUMMARY OUTLINE To help clarify the main points of our above shiur, the following outline charts out the flow of MAGID. This will be followed by some notes and later by some 'mini-shiurim' on Pesach and the Haggada which should be sent iy'h sometime between today and erev pesach. ha'gadol".

MAGID - AN OVERVIEW I. PREFACE - "ha lachma anyana..." This section serves as an introduction and invitation for others to join. **II. DEFINING OUR OBLIGATION** of "sipur Yetziat Mitzraim" A. MA NISHTANA - We encourage the children to ask in order that we can fulfill - "v'higadta l'vincha" B. The "avadim hayinu..." paragraph explains: * WHY we are obligated [otherwise we'd still be slaves] * WHO is obligated - even those who know the story! "ma'ase b'Rebbi Eliezer..." serves as proof that even those who already know the story are still obligated to re-tell it. C. The FOUR SONS section explains: * HOW we must tell the story to our children. D. The question "yachol m'rosh chodesh..." * WHEN we are obligated, i.e. on the 15th at night. **III. SIPUR YETZIAT MITZRAIM** - Telling the story of the Exodus A. Biblical (prophetic) setting/ God's covenant with the Avot 1. "m'tchila ovdei avoda zara hayu avoteinu..." WHY Avraham Avinu was chosen / a summary of the theme of Sefer Breishit, based on Yehoshua 24:1-4 2. "baruch shomer...BRIT BEIN HA'BTARIM..." (Br. 15) the covenant with the Avot in which God already foresaw the unfolding process of Yetziat Mitzraim. 3. "v'hi sh'amdah..." - the eternal aspect of that covenant, i.e. of "brit bein ha'bram". Because of this "brit", God continues to redeem Am Yisrael from peril and destruction in every generation. B. The actual story of Yetziat Mitzraim (the Exodus) - based on a "drasha" of pasuk "arami oved avi". Each word or phrase in the declaration of thanksgiving (known as MIKRA BIKURIM) is supported by a pasuk. [THIS DRASHA continues until the details of the TEN PLAGUES are completed, and is the most lengthy section of the Haggada.] C. DAYENU - a song of praise at the conclusion of the story To thank God for his salvation, we declare that even for only one stage of the redemption process it would have been enough ("dayanu") to praise God (say Hallel), even more so ("al achat kama v'kama...") that we must praise God for all fifteen stages of the redemption process. **IV. RABAN GAMLIEL** - the need to mention PESACH MATZA & MAROR. Raban Gamliel states that to properly fulfill his obligation of "SIPUR Yetziat Mitzraim" one must also be sure to explain the reason for PESACH, MATZA, and MAROR. **V. HALLEL A.** "b'chol dor v'dor..." we must feel as though we ourselves were redeemed B. "Tichach..." therefore, we are obligated to praise God... C. Hallel Mitzraim D. BIRCHAT GA'AL YISRAEL - the blessing of redemption

NOTES ON THE OUTLINE I. The opening statement of "ha lachma" is problematic since it

leaves the impression that we eat matzah because Bnei Yisrael ate matzah during their slavery, while from Sefer Shmot it seems that the main reason we eat matza is because of the hurried nature in which Bnei Yisrael left Egypt (see Shmot 12:33-40). The statement may be based on Devarim 16:1-4, where matzah is defined as "lechem oni" - bread of affliction. The question is whether "lechem oni" defines for us WHAT matzah is, or explains WHY we eat matzah. [See Ramban on "lechem oni" where he discusses two independent reasons for eating matzah, and other commentators as well.] In any case, this paragraph is not part of "sipur yetziat mitzraim", rather, it acts as a general introduction and an open invitation for others to join the Seder. Therefore, we have defined it as a 'preface'.

II. To fully appreciate why MAGID opens with "avadim hayinu", it is important to read Dvarim 6:20-25 in its context in Sefer Devarim. This parsha in Chumash explains why the future generations of Am Yisrael are obligated to keep all of the mitzvot, EVEN THOUGH they themselves were not redeemed from Egypt (only their forefathers). It focuses on our eternal obligation to keep God's mitzvot, and the centrality of our redemption from Egypt as the CAUSE for that obligation, and God's covenant with the Avot as the REASON for that redemption. Since this parsha opens with "ki yishalcha bincha" - when your son will ask you (6:20) - the Haggada places the "ma nishtana" beforehand, to properly introduce "avadim hayinu...". This paragraph in the Haggada does not continue with the story of Yetziat Mitzraim, rather continues with the definition of our obligation to tell that story, even if we know it already, even if we are wise etc., as explained above.

III. We actually fulfill the mitzvah of "sipur Yetziat Mitzraim" in this section. However, we don't begin with the story itself, for it was not by chance that Bnei Yisrael became slaves in Egypt. Their slavery was part of a divine plan which was first explained to Avraham Avinu in BRIT BEIN HA'B'TARIM. Therefore, the story can not simply begin with the enslavement of Bnei Yisrael. Rather, it must begin with BRIT AVOT, God's covenant with the forefathers, in which the concept of Yetziat Mitzraim was already foreseen. The story itself is told through the "nusach" of MIKRA BIKURIM as explained in Mishnayot Pesachim, and supported by numerous psukim from Sefer Shmot. Be sure to see as well the Ramban on Hilchot Chametz u'Matza chapter 7, especially halacha 4! Note also why this is considered a "nusach" of "haggadah" to fulfill our obligation from Shmot 13:8 based on Devarim 26:3! Note the use of the word HIGADTI in 26:3, compare with V'HIGADTA l'vincha in Shmot 13:8.

IV. It is not clear precisely which obligation Raban Gamliel is referring to. It may be the obligation of "sipur Yetziat Mitzraim", this would explain why it is added at the conclusion of the "sipur Yetziat Mitzraim" section. Alternatively, it may be the obligation to eat the korban pesach, matza, and maror (i.e. by eating matza alone, without explaining why, one does not fulfill the mitzvah). This section may also be considered a 'fill in' for the KORBAN PESACH itself. During the time of the Bet Ha'Mikdash, MAGID was said while eating the korban pesach. Nowadays, since the korban cannot be offered, we mention pesach, matza, and maror instead of offering it. Thus, this section forms an excellent introduction to the Hallel, which in ancient times was recited as the Korban Pesach was offered, and later when it was eaten.

V. Our closing statement before Hallel - "b'chol dor v'dor..." complements the opening statement of MAGID (in the "avadim hayinu" paragraph) that had God had not taken us out of Egypt we would still be enslaved until this very day. Now that we have told the story of Yetziat Mitzraim, we are supposed to feel as though we ourselves were redeemed from Egypt. [It also reflects a statement of "v'hi shamda... b'chol dor v'dor kamim aleynu..." in the middle of the Haggadah.] As Devarim 6:20-25 explains, the events of Yetziat Mitzraim obligate Am Yisrael to keep not only the mitzvot of Pesach but ALL of the mitzvot of the Torah! [See Sefer Kuzari section 1.] Therefore, in the final stage of MAGID for we praise God for Yetziat Mitzraim as though we ourselves were redeemed. shabbat "gadol" shalom, menachem

yhe-about@jer1.co.il] Yeshivat Har Etzion Virtual Bet Midrash

"Build Your House:" The Connection between Pesach, Tefillin, Mezuzah and Mila by Rav

Yaakov Medan
a. Tefillin The mitzva of tefillin is mentioned in four separate parshiot in the Torah. Two of them, "Kadesh Li" ("Sanctify to Me all firstborn...") and "Ve-haya ki yeivi'akha" ("And it shall be when God brings you...") [Shemot 13], are mentioned in the context of the story of the exodus. In fact, the dominant theme of these two parshiot is the need to remember the exodus: "And you shall say to your son on that day, 'For this God did for me when I went out of Egypt'" (ibid. 13:8). The other two parshiot, "Shema" ("Hear O Israel" - Devarim 6) and "Ve-haya im shamoa'..." ("It shall be if you shall listen...") - Devarim 11, were first mentioned some forty years later, in the plains of Moav, just prior to entry into the Land. Here, the main theme concerns acceptance of the yoke of Heaven and of the mitzvot, within the clear context of entry into the Land and the need to fulfill the mitzvot there. Hence, in short, two parshiot of tefillin deal with the exodus, and the other two with the purpose of God's nation: acceptance of the yoke of Heaven, Torah, mitzvot and Eretz Yisrael.

b. Mezuzah The "twin" of the mitzva of tefillin is that of mezuzah. They appear together in the parshiot of "Shema" and "Ve-haya im shamoa'..." and they are similar in content and essence. There are, however, some differences: the mitzva of mezuzah is mentioned in these two places only - the parshiot of "purpose." It lacks the aspect of the exodus, where the mitzva of tefillin has already been mentioned twice. Why does the mitzva of mezuzah include only the second half of the context of tefillin? Why does it involve no mention of the exodus? A further question: the name inscribed on the outside of the mezuzah, SH-D-Y, is an abbreviation for "Shomer delatot Yisrael" - Guardian of the doors of Israel. Rashi comments, "[The mitzva of] mezuzah is an obligation of the resident, for it is HIS GUARDIANSHIP" (Pesachim 4). What is the meaning and nature of this special characteristic of "guarding the doors?"

c. Pesach The laws associated with the Pesach sacrifice in Egypt hint at the solution to both problems posed by the mitzva of mezuzah: "And they shall take of the blood and shall place it on the two doorposts (mezuzot) and on the lintel." (Shemot 12:7) "And the blood shall be for you for a sign on the houses where you are, and I shall see the blood and I shall pass over you, and there shall not be among you a plague to destroy." (12:13) In other words, the Pesach sacrifice and the mezuzah are two aspects of the same idea, just as the four parshiot of tefillin are all parts of a whole. Just as two parshiot of tefillin deal with the exodus while the other two deal with God's Kingship and mitzvot, so too the mitzva of mezuzah has a dual aspect. During the

plague of the firstborn in Egypt, the mitzva of mezuzah found expression in the blood spread on the doorposts. Following the giving of the Torah, the parshiot of "Shema" and "Ve-haya im shamoa'..." mandated that we replace the blood on the doorposts with mezuzot. The guarding of the doors now prevents not only the entry of the Angel of Death bringing death to all the firstborns, but also the entry of any forces of impurity opposed to the Kingship of Heaven and the mitzvot into the pure homes of Israel.

d. Berit Mila If the "twin" of the mitzva of tefillin is that of mezuzah, then we can regard the blood of mila (circumcision) as the twin of the blood of the Pesach: "Why did God see fit to state twice the words, 'You shall live by your blood' (Yechezkel 16:6)? For He said, 'By the merit of the blood of the Pesach and the blood of mila were you redeemed from Egypt, and by merit of both will you be redeemed in the future.'" (Yalkut Shim'oni on Yechezkel, 354)

However, the connection between mila and Pesach is not the same as that between mezuzah and Pesach. The connection between mezuzah and Pesach is based on the idea that "He will not allow the Angel of Death to come to your houses to cause a plague" - the mezuzah guards the doors so that no harm will come to an Israelite house. The connection between mila and Pesach, on the other hand, is based on the idea of "And no one of you will go out of the door of his house until the morning" (Shemot 12:22), or "You shall not take any of the [sacrificial] meat from the house outside" (Shemot 12:46). Whoever removes the meat of the korban Pesach from the house, designated with the sign of the blood on the doorposts, renders it invalid. And anyone who leaves the house designated with the sign of the blood during the time when the sacrifice may be eaten, takes his life in his hands. The Angel of Death is roaming the streets of Egypt. Likewise, the berit is also a sign. It is a sign which stamps the seed of Israel with the Almighty's holiness, as we bless at a Berit Mila: "And he stamped his descendants with the sign of the holy covenant (berit)." Like the blood of the Pesach which stamps the doorway of the Jewish home so that holy Israelites will not go outside to the Angel of Death, the blood of mila stamps the opening of the Jewish body so that holy Jewish seed will not emerge in vain. Jewish seed will emerge only in holiness - just as the Israelites emerged from their homes in Egypt at the time of the exodus: in holiness, and not to destruction. The blood of the Pesach therefore contains two aspects: guarding against the entry of the Angel of Death (like the mezuzah) and guarding against going out to the Angel of Death (like berit mila). And if tefillin are worn on the body while the mezuzah is affixed to the house, likewise the blood of mila is a stamp on the body, and the blood of the Pesach a stamp on the house.

e. Freedom The Torah refers to two different things as a person's "house." 1) His family - "And he shall atone for himself and for his house" (Vayikra 16). Similarly, in the context of the Pesach sacrifice we read, "A sheep for each household, a sheep per house" (Shemot 12:3). 2) The place where he lives - "And a person who sanctifies his house as holy to God" (Vayikra 27). Similarly, concerning the Pesach we read, "And if the household number too few, then he and his neighbor who is close to his house shall take..." (Shemot 12:4). In each "house" a free person is distinguishable from a slave: "If [the slave's] master shall give him a wife and she bears him sons and daughters, the woman and her children shall belong to his master, and he shall go free by himself." (Shemot 21:4) A slave does not establish his own family. His master finds him a wife, who is not necessarily someone the slave would have chosen for himself; and his children are not his own - they belong to his master. In the words of Chazal, "A slave has no family lineage." And since his marriage to his partner - the maidservant - does not result in the establishment of a real home, it is not surprising that Chazal state, "The more maidservants, the more immorality" (Avot chap. 2). At the same time, a slave has no home of his own: "And you shall declare freedom in the land for all its inhabitants" (Vayikra 25:10) - Rabbi Yehuda said: [Freedom means] that he may live anywhere that he wishes, and he is under the auspices of someone else." (Rosh Ha-shana 9) Freedom, on the other hand, means possession of both "houses": "And you shall return each man to his possession, and each man shall return to his family." (Vayikra 25:10) The Israelite eats his Pesach sacrifice with his household (his family) and his neighbors, in his home. The blood of the Pesach is a sign on the houses. It is a sign that Israel will be brought out to freedom; that they have merited "houses" in both senses of the word.

For later generations, the mitzva of the mezuzah guards the purity of his home lest the Angel of Death enter, and the mitzva of mila guards the purity of his seed and his family lest his seed emerge to be destroyed.

f. Children of Avraham On the day of Pesach three visitors informed Avraham of the impending birth of Yitzchak (Bereishit 18, see Rashi ad loc.). The essence of the nation's forefather was clearly demonstrated in this instance: the doorway of his home, sealed against the Angel of Death, was open wide for visitors from the desert. The opening of his body, sealed with the sign of God's covenant against emergence of impure seed, will now be open to allow for the birth of pure seed - his son, Yitzchak. And since that time the doors of his children, sealed with the blood of the Pesach against the entry of the Angel of Death, are open to visitors, the needy, the hungry: "Anyone who is hungry, let him enter and eat; anyone who is needy, let him enter and partake of the Pesach" (from the Haggada). The lower opening of the body is sealed with the blood of mila against the emergence of impure seed, but the upper opening - the mouth - opens to recount before the pure seed, the wise son who poses his questions, the story of the exodus. In both aspects of our "houses" - in our homes and amongst our families - we embark on the Haggada of Pesach.

[HTTP://WWW.VIRTUAL.CO.IL/EDUCATION/YHE](http://www.virtual.co.il/education/yhe)

dafyomi@jer1.co.il] Insights into Daf Yomi from Ohr Somayach Shabbos 128-134

A Psychological Emergency A woman during childbirth is considered as being in a situation where her life is in danger and it is therefore permitted to attend to all her needs on Shabbos even if this involves violating the Shabbos. This includes not only her obvious medical needs but also her psychological ones as well because they too can have an impact on her survival. This finds expression in the statement of our gemara that if she is giving birth at night her friend may light a candle for her. This rule, explains the gemara, extends even to a blind woman giving birth. Even though she will not be any more aware of what is happening as a result of this illumination we may light the candle in order to provide her with the reassurance that in case she needs something, her friends will be able to see the need and take care of it. The light in this case, explain the

commentaries, is not necessary for medical purposes, because the midwife can easily make the delivery without the light of the candle. Its purpose is simply to save the woman from the anxiety which can endanger her life. It is for this reason, points out Tosofos, that there is no need for a doctor to rule that she is in need of such reassurance, as is required in deciding whether a sick person must eat on Yom Kippur. The danger to a woman in childbirth from the fear that she is not being properly treated is greater than the possibility of fasting adversely affecting someone ill. A practical application of this concept of psychological assistance is the rule that a woman giving birth, or any other person in need of emergency medical attention to save his life, may be accompanied in the ambulance taking them to the hospital by a family member or friend who will provide them with the reassurance they require in order to prevent their situation from deteriorating due to panic. Shabbos 128b

Near and Far A mitzvah which Jews accepted upon themselves with joy, such as the mitzvah of milah, is still celebrated by them with joy (with a festive meal - Rashi). But a mitzvah which they accepted in a spirit of discord, such as the prohibition of marrying close relatives, is still marked by discord, for there is no marriage contract which is free of some bickering. Why did Jews react with such resentment to the ban on marrying close relatives? Human logic dictates that two people who come from the same source are more likely to form a harmonious couple and to produce children who do not have the conflicting traits which can result from a blending of genes. The Torah, however, overruled this approach and insisted that marriage take place only between two parties who are not closely related to each other. Such a union may indeed spark an initial collision between disparate personalities insisting on different things. The marriage contract which is the first meeting of these two different minds may therefore prove to be the "battleground" for their minor skirmish. The Divine wisdom in prescribing such a union is only fully appreciated after the wedding takes place and the seemingly incompatible partners form a solid bond which will not easily be dissolved. As to an understanding of the Torah ban on relatives, Rambam in his Guide to the Perplexed offers one approach that there was a need to safeguard the respect due to certain relatives, a respect which would be undermined by intimate relations. This approach and another one put forward by Rambam are rejected by Ramban who hints at a mystical basis. He nevertheless offers a logical explanation as well - that a child born of related parents tends to be physically weaker. His comment that this is a well known medical fact is understood to be a reference to the hemophilia prevalent amongst royal inbreeding families. Shabbos 130a

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Shabbos 131 ... 2) LEARNING A LAW FROM SUKAH FOR LULAV QUESTION: The Gemara says that according to Rabbi Eliezer, the Halachah that preparations for the Mitzvah of Lulav override Shabbos is derived from the word "ba'Yom" which appears in a verse discussing Lulav. The Rabanan, though, maintain that that phrase is needed to teach that the Mitzvah of Lulav is performed only during the day and not at night, because we might have compared Lulav to Sukah through a Gezeirah Shavah between the two (from the words "Shiv'as Yamim") and assumed that just like the Mitzvah of Sukah applies at night, so, too, does the Mitzvah of Lulav. Rabbi Eliezer, though, does not need a second phrase to teach that the Mitzvah of Lulav is not performed at night. It seems that Rabbi Eliezer maintained that there was no reason to compare Sukah to Lulav; he argued that there is no Gezeirah Shavah of "Shiv'as Yamim." However, in the following lines of the Gemara, Rabbi Eliezer says that the reason why the preparations for the Mitzvah of Sukah override Shabbos is because of the Gezeirah Shavah comparing Sukah to Lulav! If Rabbi Eliezer accepts the Gezeirah Shavah between Lulav and Sukah, then why does he not require another verse to teach that the Mitzvah of Lulav is performed only during the day (and not at night as well, like Sukah)?

ANSWERS: (a) TOSFOS (DH Shiv'as) answers that although Rabbi Eliezer agrees that there is a Gezeirah Shavah, he maintains that it cannot be applied when the very words used for the Gezeirah Shavah -- "Shiv'as Yamim" ("seven days") -- seem to preclude the law derived from it! That is, the word "days" cannot teach that just like the Mitzvah of Sukah is performed at night, so, too, the Mitzvah of Lulav is performed at night*, because such a teaching would contradict the simple meaning of the words used for the Gezeirah Shavah -- "seven *days*." (b) The RE'AH and RITVA answer that Rabbi Eliezer maintained that the Sukah and Lulav cannot be compared as far as night is concerned for another reason. With regard to Sukah, the Halachah is that the Mitzvah applies *all* day and *all* night. This Halachah cannot be applied to Lulav, because the Torah certainly does not require that the Lulav be held all day and all night. On the other hand, it is unacceptable to suggest that the Gezeirah Shavah teaches that one must pick up the Lulav *once* at night, because then the Halachah with regard to Lulav is not similar to the Halachah with regard to Sukah, from which the Halachah is derived. (c) The RASHBA explains that Rabbi Eliezer indeed learns from a verse that the Mitzvah of Lulav does not apply at night: from the verse "Shiv'as *Yamim*" (which incidentally is the verse used for the Gezeirah Shavah). However, the Rabanan maintain that *two* verses (Shiv'as Yamim, ba'Yom) are necessary to teach that the Lulav is not taken at night, since there are two different Halachos with regard to the Mitzvah of Lulav that are only done by day. The first Halachah is that in the *Beis ha'Mikdash*, the Mitzvah is to hold the Lulav for seven days. The second Halachah is that *outside* of the Beis ha'Mikdash, the Lulav is held only the first day. Consequently, one verse is needed to teach that the Lulav is not held at night in the Beis ha'Mikdash, and another verse is needed to teach that it is not held at night outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rabbi Eliezer, though, maintains that the Halachah that the Lulav is not held at night outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is derived from the Halachah with regard to inside the Beis ha'Mikdash, and thus only one verse is needed to teach that it is not held at night.

Shabbos 132 1) FORFEITING THE MITZVAH OF MILAH OPINIONS: The Torah commands every Jewish male to be circumcised, with a penalty of Kares for failure to fulfill this Mitzvas Aseh. If a person was not given a Milah when he was a baby and when he matures he is still uncircumcised, does he transgress the Mitzvah every day that passes that he is not circumcised until he becomes circumcised? (a) The Gemara teaches that Milah is the type of Mitzvah that, if

performed after its prescribed time, is not forfeited -- as opposed to Mitzvos such as Sukah, Lulav, and Shofar, which are forfeited if they are not performed at their prescribed time. It is clear from here that if a Jewish man does not become circumcised until he is older, he is not considered to have forfeited the Mitzvah each day that passed that he did not circumcise himself. Rather, since he finally fulfilled the Mitzvah of Milah, he never forfeited the Mitzvah. This also seems to be the intention of Tosfos (131a, DH v'Shavin). Only if he dies uncircumcised is he considered to have forfeited the Mitzvah and is Chayav Kares. (b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Milah 1:3) writes that a person who does not circumcise himself transgresses the Mitzvas Aseh *every day* that passes. However, he is Chayav Kares only if he dies without a Milah. The fact that he is Chayav Kares only if he dies without a Milah is consistent with our Gemara, since he only forfeits the Mitzvah when he dies without Milah. But how can the Rambam write that he transgresses a Mitzvas Aseh *every day* that he delays his Milah? ANSWER: The RA'AVAD apparently understood that the Rambam meant to say that a person transgresses the Mitzvas Aseh every day *mi'Safek*, out of doubt, because of the possibility that he *might* die without a Milah. He only transgresses the Mitzvas Aseh every day when he has intention *never* to fulfill the Mitzvah of Milah at all. If so, if a person has intention to have a Milah at any time later in his life, he does not transgress the Mitzvas Aseh as each day passes, as our Gemara says.

Shabbos 133 1) "DAVAR SHE'INO MISKAVEN" AND CUTTING OFF A LEPROUS "NEGA" QUESTION: The Gemara says that according to Rabbi Yehudah, it is forbidden mid'Oraisa to perform Milah when there is a leprous Nega that is Tamei on the place of the Milah. Even though one does not have intention (Eino Miskaven) to cut off the Nega, nevertheless a Davar sh'Eino Miskaven is forbidden mid'Oraisa according to Rabbi Yehudah. (The Gemara concludes that even according to Rabbi Shimon it is prohibited, because even though it is a Pesik Reishei). Why does the Gemara say that according to Rabbi Yehudah it is forbidden *mid'Oraisa* to perform a Davar sh'Eino Miskaven and cut off the Nega? We find that Rabbi Yehudah normally prohibits a Davar sh'Eino Miskaven only *mid'Rabanan* and not mid'Oraisa (see Rashi 121b, DH l'Fi Tumo; Tosfos 41b, DH Meicham)! ANSWER: The MAHARSHAL explains that only with regard to the laws of Shabbos does Rabbi Yehudah say that a Davar sh'Eino Miskaven is forbidden mid'Rabanan. As TOSFOS (41b) explains, with regard to Shabbos the Torah requires explicit intent to perform the Melachah (Melech Machsheves) in order to be Chayav. With regard to other prohibitions of the Torah, though (such as our case of cutting off a Nega), which are not regulated by the condition of Melech Machsheves, a Davar sh'Eino Miskaven will be forbidden mid'Oraisa.

4) DOING "MELACHAH" FOR A BABY WHOSE MILAH IS ON SHABBOS QUESTION: The Mishnah states that all actions necessary to perform the Milah are permitted on Shabbos. If the medicine for the child was not prepared and ground before Shabbos, one should chew it with his teeth in order to prepare it with a Shinuy. Why must one do a Shinuy? Normally, in a situation of Piku'ach Nefesh, it is permissible to do a Melachah on Shabbos (Shabbos is "Hutrah") and there is no need to perform a Melachah through the use of a Shinuy! ANSWER: TOSFOS (133b, DH Lo'es) emphasizes that even though this is a situation of Piku'ach Nefesh, one must try to do a Shinuy if possible when performing a Melachah. The SHACH (YD 266:3) explains that since a person knows *in advance* that the child will be in a state of Piku'ach Nefesh, it is not as absolutely permitted to do a Melachah as it is in a normal case of Piku'ach Nefesh, and therefore one must make a Shinuy. (The SEFAS EMES here offers the same explanation. See Insights to Shabbos 128b and Nidah 38b regarding doing Melachah on Shabbos with a Shinuy for a woman in labor.)

133b 5) "ZEH KELI V'ANVEIHU" -- THE CONCEPT OF BEAUTIFYING A MITZVAH OPINIONS: The Gemara cites a Beraisa that says that when a Milah is performed on Shabbos, a Mohel must go back and cut off the Tzitzin ha'Me'akvin, any pieces of skin remaining that cover a majority of the Atarah after the Orlah was cut off (the Milah is not valid with such Tzitzin remaining), regardless of whether or not he is still involved in the Milah. He does not go back and cut off the Tzitzin sh'Einan Me'akvin (that is, those Tzitzin that do not invalidate the Milah), though, if he is no longer involved in the Milah. The Gemara explains that this depends on an argument between Rabbi Yosi and the Chachamim regarding the removal and replacement of the Lechem ha'Panim in the Beis ha'Mikdash. According to the Chachamim, the Kohanim who bring in the new Lechem ha'Panim must replace the old Lechem ha'Panim immediately when the old Lechem ha'Panim are removed in order for it to be considered "Tamid," since the Torah requires that there be Lechem ha'Panim on the Shulchan at all times -- "Tamid." According to Rabbi Yosi, the new Lechem ha'Panim may be placed on the Shulchan later the same day, and that is also called "Tamid." According to Rabbi Yosi, acts done at different times are still considered to be part of one action, and that is why the Lechem ha'Panim are considered to be on the Shulchan "Tamid." In contrast, the Chachamim maintain that two acts are only considered to be parts of one long action if they are done in immediate succession, with no delay between them. In what way does this argument relate to cutting off the Tzitzin sh'Einan Me'akvin on Shabbos? (a) RASHI and most Rishonim explain that the reason a person must go back to remove Tzitzin sh'Einan Me'akvin is because of the requirement to beautify one's performance of Mitzvos, which is learned from the verse, "Zeh Keli v'Anveihu," as the Gemara mentions. On Shabbos, though, since the presence of these Tzitzin does not invalidate the Milah, one may not do a Melachah merely to fulfill the concept of beautifying the Mitzvah. However, if it is done as part of one long action of performing the Milah, then it may also be done on Shabbos, because it is considered as part of the Milah. (b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Milah 2:4,6) rules that a Mohel does not have to go back to cut off the Tzitzin sh'Einan Me'akvin even during the week (according to the Kesef Mishnah's conclusion in his interpretation of the RAMBAM). The BRISKER RAV (Hilchos Chanukah 4:1) and the BEIS HA'LEVI (2:47) explain that the Rambam learned the Gemara the same as RABEINU CHANANEL. Rabeinu Chananel writes that one who stops performing a Mitzvah is no longer required to beautify that Mitzvah. That means that beautifying a Mitzvah is only meaningful when it is done as part of the performance of the Mitzvah. After the Mitzvah has been performed, there is no point in beautifying it. The beautification is in the *performance*, or the act, of the Mitzvah, and not in the *object*, or the result, of the Mitzvah that remains when the performance of the Mitzvah is completed. Therefore, after the Milah is performed, there is no point in making the Milah look nice because of the requirement to beautify Mitzvos. Only during the act of Milah itself is there a requirement to make it look nice.

Shabbos 134 1) CAUSING "CHILUL SHABBOS" FOR THE SAKE OF "PIKU'ACH

NEFESH" OPINIONS: The Mishnah (133a) states that if the post-operative medications which are administered after the Milah were not prepared before Shabbos, then one may prepare them on Shabbos with a Shinuy (e.g. they should be chewed, and not ground in the normal fashion). What about if there is no way to do the Melachah with a Shinuy, and performing the Milah on Shabbos will necessitate that a Melachah be done on Shabbos for the sake of the baby (for example, if hot water for washing the baby after the Milah was not prepared before Shabbos)? May the Milah be performed on Shabbos, thus putting the baby in a state of danger so that a Melachah must be done for him, or is it better to delay performing the Milah until the next day and not do it in its proper time, in order to avoid necessitating Chilul Shabbos? (a) The BA'AL HA'ME'OR says that in such a situation, the Milah should *not* be performed on Shabbos. It is better to delay the Milah than to enter into a situation which will certainly result in a Melachah d'Oraisa being performed, albeit for Piku'ach Nefesh. (b) The RAMBAM (Milchamos) says that it is permitted to perform the Milah on Shabbos, even though it will cause Chilul Shabbos for Piku'ach Nefesh, because at this moment (before the Milah has been done) there is no need for a Melachah to be performed, and there is an obligation to do the Mitzvah. We do not have to be concerned prior to the Milah that it will necessitate the desecration of Shabbos after the Milah for the sake of Piku'ach Nefesh. The Acharonim point out (KEHILAS YAKOV #15, and others) that the Ramban and Ba'al ha'Me'or are consistent with their respective opinions elsewhere (Shabbos 19a). The Ba'al ha'Me'or said that one may not embark on a sea-voyage within three days of Shabbos, because it is common for sea-travel to create a situation of Piku'ach Nefesh. Traveling by sea on Shabbos might *possibly* necessitate the desecration of Shabbos (see Insights to Shabbos 19); therefore it is forbidden. The Ramban (Milchamos, Shabbos 19) maintains that we are not concerned with the desecration of Shabbos that might come about, because at this moment there is no Melachah being done and when it does become necessary to desecrate the Shabbos, it will be permitted because of Piku'ach Nefesh. The commentaries (see Mishnah Berurah 328:39) suggest that this argument depends on the nature of the why one may violate the Shabbos for the sake of Piku'ach Nefesh. If Shabbos is only "Dechuyah" in the event of Piku'ach Nefesh (literally, it is "pushed off," the prohibition against Shabbos desecration is still in force, but it is *overridden* by the necessity to do a Melachah for Piku'ach Nefesh; see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 2:1), it would be logical to accept the Ba'al ha'Me'or's assertion; Chilul Shabbos even for Piku'ach Nefesh must be avoided wherever possible. On the other hand, if Shabbos is "Hutrah" in the event of Piku'ach Nefesh (it is "permitted," that is, from the start the laws of Shabbos were *never prescribed* for situations of Piku'ach Nefesh and therefore there is no desecration of Shabbos when a Melachah is performed for Piku'ach Nefesh; see Bi'ur Halachah, ad loc., who cites the ROSH and MAHARAM MI'ROTENBURG who ascribe to this view), then the Ramban's ruling makes sense. (See also Insights to Shabbos 30a, Shabbos 128b, Shabbos 133a, and Nidah 38b; see also Kehilat Yakov ibid. and Mishmeret Chaim vol. 1 who discuss the comparison between the Ba'al ha'Me'or's statements here and earlier in Shabbos.)

3) AND THEY CALLED HIM "NASAN HA'BAVLI" QUESTION: A woman came to Rabbi Nasan with her third son and wanted to know what to do. Her first two sons had died as a result of their Milah. Rabbi Nasan looked at the baby and saw that he was very red, and said, "Wait until his body absorbs his blood." She waited as directed, and the son indeed lived after his Milah. They called the child "Nasan ha'Bavli" in honor of Rabbi Nasan. Another time, a woman in the same situation came to Rabbi Nasan with her third son. He looked at the baby and saw that he was very pale; he further examined the baby and did not see any Dam Bris. He directed the woman to wait until the baby develops more blood. She followed his advice and the baby lived after his Milah, and they called *his name* "Nasan ha'Bavli" in honor of Rabbi Nasan. Why does the Gemara say in the second case that they *called his name* "Nasan ha'Bavli," while in the first case it mentions only that they *called him* "Nasan ha'Bavli"? ANSWER: RAV YAKOV D. HOMNICK (NACHALAS YAKOV) points out that according to Rashi, in the second case, there were two problems. First, the baby boy was in mortal danger if a Milah would be performed while he was pale. Secondly, even if Milah was performed no blood would ooze from the cut. Since Dam Bris is necessary for the Mitzvah of Milah to be properly fulfilled, it would not have been a proper fulfillment of the Mitzvah. Rashi derived this from the fact that in the second case, Rabbi Nasan added that he did not see any Dam Bris. In the first case, though, the only problem was the mortal danger that the baby faced. Therefore, in the first case, the people were relieved and expressed their gratitude to Rabbi Nasan only days or weeks after the Milah was performed, when it became evident that the baby would live. At the time of the Milah, though, it was not clear yet that he would live. They named the baby whatever they named him at the time of the Milah and Kerias Shem, and only *later* did they begin to "call him" by the name "Nasan ha'Bavli" in appreciation. In the second case, the people were grateful to Rabbi Nasan at the very moment that Dam Bris flowed from the Milah (which apparently had not occurred when the child's older brothers were circumcised). They therefore *called the name* of the child by the name of "Nasan ha'Bavli," when he was named during the Milah, in appreciation for his advice that led to the Mitzvah being fulfilled properly.

134b 4) THE THIRD DAY AFTER "MILAH" QUESTION: The Gemara explains that the Tana Kama and Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah argue whether it is permitted to wash a baby on Shabbos which is the third day after the Milah. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah cites a verse to support his opinion; when the wicked men of Shechem were in pain from their Milah, Shimon and Levi attacked the city and killed all of the men (Bereishis 34:25). From there we see that a person is in pain on the third day after the Milah, and therefore his needs may be fulfilled without a Shinuy according to Rabbi Elazar. The Tana Kama argues and maintains that the child may be washed only on the first two days after the Milah, but not on the third day (RASHI DH Ela Iy Amrit), because by then he is no longer in so much danger and it is not necessary to do a Melachah in order to wash him. It seems clear from our Sugya that one who has undergone Milah is in more pain during the first two days, while on the third day it is questionable whether Melachah may be done in order to wash him. If so, why did the sons of Yakov Avinu wait until the third day to attack the people of Shechem? They should have attacked right away, on the first or second day after the Milah, when the people would be more ill and weaker from their Milah! ANSWERS: (a) The Rishonim explain that according to Rashi's understanding of the Sugya, the following dichotomy must be made. With regard to a person's physical health, he is in greater danger on the first two days after the Milah than on the third day. However, with regard to the person's *strength*, a person is weaker on the third day than on the first two days (because he has already suffered from his wound for two days). The sons of Yakov Avinu, who wanted to attack the people of Shechem when they were at their

weakest point after their Milah, waited until the third day to attack them. During the first two days, even though the Shechemites were in more pain, they were stronger and would have been able to flee or to fight back. Our Gemara, though, is referring to one's state of health, which is certainly worse on the first two days after the Milah than it is on the third. (b) The RIF and RAMBAM understand this Gemara differently than Rashi. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah only permits washing the child on the third day, and not on the second day, and the Tana Kama does not permit washing the child on the second or third day. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah permits washing the child on the third day, because on that day in particular the child is in greater danger. When the Gemara says that the Tana Kama agrees that the baby may be washed on the first day, it is referring to the point *immediately* after the Milah, when the child is certainly in a state of danger. The sons of Yakov Avinu waited until the third day to attack Shechem because that is when a person is in the greatest danger as a result of his Milah.

Shabbos 135 1) HALACHAH: AN "EIGHTH-MONTH" BABY The Beraisa states that a baby born after eight months is not considered to be living and is Muktzah and forbidden to be handled on Shabbos. TOSFOS (DH Ben Shemonah) writes that this Halachah does not apply today for two reasons. First, we are not knowledgeable enough to know whether the baby was born after eight months or after nine months, and the Halachah is that when we are in doubt whether a baby was born after eight months or nine months we treat him like a ninth-month baby. Second, even if we would know for certain that the baby was born after eight months, the Gemara in Yevamos (80b) teaches that the baby is only considered not to be living when its hair and fingernails are not completely developed (a sign that the baby is not physically complete). If the baby is fully developed, even if it is born after eight months it is considered to be alive. It is looked at as "a seventh-month baby that was born in the eighth month," after tarrying a few days inside the womb. Therefore, a baby born even in the eighth month is considered to be alive unless it is obviously not fully developed. HALACHAH: This is also the ruling of the SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 330:7-8); only if a baby born after eight months has obvious signs of incomplete development is it forbidden to be handled on Shabbos (see Mishnah Berurah 330:30 who cites a different view in the name of the Vilna Ga'on).

2) HALACHAH: A CONVERT WHO WAS ALREADY CIRCUMCISED AND A BABY BORN CIRCUMCISED OPINIONS: Is there a requirement to perform Hatafas Dam Bris to a gentile who is in the process of converting to Judaism *after* having been circumcised, or to a baby who was *born* circumcised? (a) TOSFOS (DH Lo Nechleku) and RABEINU CHANANEL rule that neither needs Hatafas Dam Bris. They rule in accordance with Rav, who argues with Shmuel and says that the Halachah is like the Tana Kama's version of Beis Hillel's opinion. Beis Hillel, according to the Tana Kama, says that a baby born circumcised does not need Hatafas Dam Bris. Consequently, a convert certainly does not need Hatafas Dam Bris, because the requirement of Hatafah for a baby is more strict than that for a convert. (This hierarchy is evident from the Gemara, where we find that even according to the opinion that maintains that a baby born circumcised *needs* Hatafas Dam Bris, a convert does *not need* Hatafah). (b) The BEHAG says that a baby born circumcised does not need Hatafas Dam Bris, like Tosfos says, because we follow the ruling of Rav. However, the Behag rules that a convert who was already circumcised *does* require Hatafah (basing his ruling on a Gemara in Yevamos 46b). This seems to contradict the logic of our Gemara, which implies that a convert needs Hatafah to a *lesser* degree than a child born circumcised. Tosfos, in the name of Rabeinu Shimshon, explains that indeed logic would require that Hatafas Dam Bris should be necessary for both a circumcised gentile and a baby born circumcised. However, the Tana Kama derives from the word "Orlaso" in the verse that not only is Hatafas Dam Bris *not* performed on Shabbos (as stated earlier on this Amud), but it is not required of a born-circumcised baby at all. However, that verse was stated only with regard to a baby, and not with regard to a convert. Therefore, with regard to a convert the logic that Hatafah is required remains, and thus a convert needs Hatafas Dam Bris. To elaborate on the logic behind this statement we can suggest that the convert may need Hatafah because he was born with an Orlah. The Torah considers someone who was born with an Orlah to be someone to whom Milah can be performed. Therefore, even if he decides to become Jewish after he cut off the Orlah he is obligated to do some action, just like the person who still has an Orlah. This obligation is fulfilled by Hatafas Dam Bris (ROSH). Alternatively, perhaps a convert needs Hatafah because he must do some *action* in order to become part of the Jewish people. He must have a Milah not only to fulfill the Mitzvah of Milah, but also to make him into a Jew. Even if he was already circumcised when he was a gentile, some action must be done in order to make him part of the Jewish people. The baby, however, is Jewish by virtue of being born to a Jewish mother, and he needs no action to make him part of the Jewish people. (c) The RIF and RAMBAM (Hilchos Milah 1:7) rule that *both* a gentile who was circumcised and a baby born circumcised need Hatafas Dam Bris. The KESEF MISHNAH explains that this ruling is based on the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ha'Kafar who says that Beis Hillel maintains that both need Hatafas Dam Bris. However, the Rambam (Hilchos Milah 3:6) rules that no blessing is recited when Hatafah is performed to the convert. If the Rambam rules like Rabbi Eliezer ha'Kafar, why should one not recite a blessing? The RAN (on the Rif) explains that the Rambam is not ruling definitely like Rabbi Eliezer ha'Kafar. Rather, the Rambam is in doubt whom the Halachah follows, and therefore he rules that a convert needs Hatafah but without a blessing. HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (YD 266:4) rules that a baby born circumcised needs Hatafah. The SHACH writes that no blessing is recited unless there seems to be some tightly pressed Orlah that is difficult to discern. Concerning a convert, the SHULCHAN ARUCH (YD 268:1) rules like the Rambam that a convert also needs Hatafah but without a blessing.

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